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Abstract 
 
Every security concerned enterprise selects its own security measures in order to avoid unexpected events 
and accidents. The main objective of these security measures is to protect the enterprise’s own resources 
and assets from damage. Most of the time, the accidents or disasters take place in enterprise are similar in 
nature, and are caused by similar kind of vulnerabilities. However, many security analysts find it difficult 
to select the right security measure for a particular problem because the previous proven solutions are not 
properly documented. In this context Security Patterns could be helpful since they present the proven 
solutions that potentially could be reused in the similar situations. 
In this thesis, we develop a set of ten Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP) and define the way how they 
could be used to define security countermeasures within the business process models. In principle, patterns 
are modelling language-independent. Moreover, to ease their application, we represent them in a graphical 
form using the Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN) modelling approach.  
We demonstrate the usability of the Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP) by applying them on two 
industrial business models. We present the quantitative analysis of their application. We show that 
Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP) help to determine security risks in business models and suggest 
rationale for security solutions. 
The results of this research could potentially encourage the security analysts to follow pattern-based 
approach to develop secure business processes, thus, contributing to secure Information Systems (IS).  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
    
Business processes are vulnerable to various security risks. Most of the time, the business analysts remain 
busy in optimising the processes, rather than focusing on security aspects. Security is often given less 
priority, and it is addressed at later stages (e.g. implementation stage) of process development. We wish to 
move security to an early stage of business process development and propose a pattern-based solution for 
accomplishing it.   
 
1.1 Motivation 
Today’s business enterprises depend on Information Technology (IT). The business decision-maker would 
like all technical activities - which affect their enterprise, to be consistent with accomplishing the 
enterprise’s goals. However, reality often frustrates them by challenging with unexpected and unfortunate 
events. Industrial information leakage, bank credit card frauds are common news in daily newspapers 
(Markoff, 2012) (Gaudin, 2007). All these incidents harm the reputation of business companies and as a 
result, they suffer financial loss. This scenario inspires us to conduct research for finding pattern-based 
security solution - which could be helpful for saving companies and industries business processes from 
future tragedies. 
 
1.2 Scope 
 
The research utilises Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) (Dubois, et al., 2010) - a 
risk analysis framework, to analyse business processes for security issues. It also uses Business Process 
Modelling Notation (BPMN) (OMG, 2012)  to understand the performance collaborations and business 
transactions present in business processes. The research discusses about the origin of security patterns, 
their domains and documentation method. Two major alignments: between ISSRM and BPMN, and 
between ISSRM and Security Pattern, are used for developing Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP). 
Different vulnerability taxonomies (Tsipenyuk, et al., 2005), (Landwehr, et al., 1994) and (R.Abbott, et al., 
1975) are discussed to estimate the scope of SRP development. Ten Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP) 
are developed for the purpose of addressing business process security risks. The research also proposes 
SRP application guideline for the development of secure business processes. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
We present three research questions which help to achieve our research objective. The questions should 
also help the readers to understand the overall purpose and contribution of this research-based thesis. Here, 
we explain the questions and their answers are given at the end of this report. 
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RQ 1: How to make business process secure? 
This questions stands as the main research problem of this thesis. Previously, we have mentioned different 
types of industrial frauds and IT related security issues - which often act as headache of business owners. 
As an answer to this question, how business analyst and security analyst could use Security Risk-oriented 
Patterns (SRP) to develop secured business processes will be described. 
RQ 2: What are the Security Risk-oriented Patterns to secure business processes? 
The research focuses on developing Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP). These SRPs are used to 
address security risks - which are present in business processes. The answer of this question will provide 
the descriptions of ten Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP). 
RQ 3: How do the Security Risk-oriented Patterns help to secure business processes? 
This question seeks the answer regarding the usefulness of Security Risk-oriented Pattern (SRP) in 
business process security risk mitigation. The answer will present the SRP application guideline and the 
results after applying them in two case studies.  
 
1.4 Research Method 
 
In figure 1, we show our research method which contains three stages (orange coloured boxes), five 
primary inputs (blue coloured boxes) and four outcomes (pink coloured boxes). Three of these outcomes 
are also considered as derived inputs for latter two stages (Knowledge, Security Risk-oriented Patterns, 
and Security Risk-oriented Pattern Application Guideline). The research stages are described below: 
Stage One: Background Study. Various research papers, books are read and analysed during the 
research preparation period. The background materials are divided into two types: Security risk mitigation 
related and Business process management (BPM) related literatures. Security risk mitigation related 
literatures help to understand different types of vulnerabilities, threats, security risks and negative impacts. 
These also introduce with Security risk management frameworks and Patter-based security solutions. On 
the other hand, Business process management related literatures describe various business process 
modelling approaches, the relationships between the process execution and the used resources, and many 
other aspects of Business process management (BPM). The combined knowledge - acquired from both of 
these literature types, assists us to carry on the research. 
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Figure 1 Research Method 
 
 
Stage Two: Security Risk-oriented Pattern Development. In this stage, with the help of Security Risk-
oriented Pattern (SRP) template (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2011), ten Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP) 
are prepared for addressing eight categories of vulnerabilities (Tsipenyuk, et al., 2005). The Security Risk-
oriented Pattern (SRP) application guideline is also proposed.  
Stage Three: Validation. In the final stage, The SRPs are applied according to the proposed SRP 
application guideline in two case studies. The quantitative results of the validation are presented is tabular 
format. 
 
 
 
 16 
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
 
Figure 2 presents the structure of the thesis. Each box represents a single 
chapter, and the boxes marked with the same colour belong to the same 
part of the thesis report. 
 
The report is consists of nine chapters. Chapter 1 presents the overview 
of thesis scope, motivation, research questions and research method. Part 
I consists of four chapters. Chapter 2 discusses about Security Risk 
Management. This discussion includes different risk analysis 
frameworks, especially, Information System Security Risk Management 
(ISSRM) (Dubois, et al., 2010), its domain model and ISSRM process. 
In chapter 3, ISSRM framework is aligned with Business Process 
Modelling Notation (BPMN) (Altuhhova, et al., 2012). Chapter 4 
describes security patterns and the benefits of using them. It also 
presents a complete Security Risk-oriented Pattern Template (Ahmed & 
Matulevičius, 2011) aligned with ISSRM domain elements. Next, 
chapter 5 introduces with different categories of vulnerabilities 
responsible for causing different types of risks. Part II includes two 
chapters. Chapter 6 presents ten Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP). 
Their application guideline is describes in chapter 7. In chapter 8, ten 
SRPs are validated in two case studies. Finally, chapter 9 provides the 
conclusion and future research directions.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Thesis structure 
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        Part I          
Background Study 
 
This part surveys the state-of-the-art of security risk management frameworks, business process modelling 
approaches, security patterns and the vulnerability taxonomies.  It consists of four chapters. 
The second chapter discusses different security risk management approaches and frameworks. Advantages 
of Information System Security Risk management (ISSRM) (Dubois, et al., 2010) approach over CORAS 
(Lund, et al., 2011) and AURUM (Ekelhart, et al., 2009) are discussed. ISSRM domain model and ISSRM 
process are explained further in this chapter. 
The third chapter is about Business Process Management. It focuses on different business process 
modelling approaches which are currently being used by process analysts. Different criteria of good 
modelling languages are mentioned. The chapter shows the potentiality of Business Process Modelling 
Notation (BPMN) (OMG, 2012) in performing business process security risk analysis by presenting the 
Three-level risk analysis approach. ISSRM & BPMN (Altuhhova, et al., 2012) alignment explains how the 
current limitations of BPMN in security risk analysis could be resolved. At the end of the chapter, an 
alignment between business process modelling and security requirements is also proposed. 
The fourth chapter begins with a short history of pattern-based solution in software engineering. This is 
followed by the benefits of using pattern-based security approach. The chapter discusses about different 
pattern domains and structure of security pattern. We are introduced with Security Risk-oriented Pattern 
Template proposed by (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2011). This template is used to develop ten Security Risk-
oriented Patterns (SRP). 
The fifth chapter surveys different taxonomies of vulnerabilities. The taxonomy model proposed in ‘Seven 
Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors’ (Tsipenyuk, et al., 2005) is chosen to 
estimate the scope of SRP coverage area. Eight vulnerability categories are discussed in details which are 
responsible for causing different categories of security risks, and these risks are addressed by the SRPs.
 18 
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Chapter 2 Security Risk Management 
 
There exist several approaches for security risk management. In this chapter, we review three of these: 
AURUM (Ekelhart, et al., 2009), CORAS (Lund, et al., 2011) and ISSRM (Dubois, et al., 2010) . We shed 
light on all these frameworks and present our arguments behind choosing Information System Security 
Risk Management (ISSRM) as the framework for security risk management in our research. In addition, 
ISSRM is described in detail which should help to understand how to determine valuable assets, potential 
security risks and countermeasures to these risks. 
 
2.1 Security Risk Management Approaches 
Today’s researchers view security risk management mainly in two different ways. The first group of 
researchers takes the asset-based evaluation approach (Dubois, et al., 2010). In this approach, the 
researchers estimate risk on the basis of asset analysis. By doing this, business process analysts are able to 
trace the risk origins - which are the vulnerable assets. On the other hand, the second group of researchers 
focuses on the value of the business processes, rather than on the assets (Khanmohammadi, 2010). They 
believe, since enterprises’ earned revenue is directly related to their core business processes, so a business 
process renders more value to an enterprise than its assets involved in accomplishing the process, and 
therefore, they should focus on business process-related risk analysis. In fact, this second approach 
evaluates assets too, but rather than direct assessment, it evaluates indirectly.  
Other approaches like CORAS (Lund, et al., 2011) uses customised language for risk modelling and it 
describes how the language could be used effectively for capturing relevant information during security 
analysis. CORAS presents the result of analysis in UML and performs the process of analysis in eight 
different steps (CORAS, 2012). 
 
Automated Risk and Utility Management or AURUM - proposed by (Ekelhart, et al., 2009), supports 
NISTSP 800-30 (Jakoubi, et al., 2009) risk management standards. However, NISTSP 800-30 divides the 
risk management process into three major steps (risk assessment, risk evaluation and risk mitigation); but 
in AURUM, ten distinct steps are being followed. Besides, AURUM obeys the security ontology 
described in (Ekelhart, et al., 2007). 
Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) (Dubois, et al., 2010) uses security modelling 
language for counting security issues and correlates risk management task throughout all stages of 
Information System development. Risk management process is carried out from three different conceptual 
levels such as: Asset- related, Risk-related and Risk treatment-related concepts. Risk management process 
could continue while developing Information System, which is a unique feature of this risk management 
approach.   
In these above mentioned approaches, two common steps are performed during security risk management. 
The first step is to identify and estimate the risks present in a business process on the basis of empirical 
data, knowledge and expertise. This step also includes prioritising the risks according to their severities.  
In the second step, security analysts search for security solutions, compare them according to their cost 
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and feasibility to mitigate the identified risks. These two steps could only be performed effectively when 
the sufficient empirical data and expertise are present. 
 
2.2 Why ISSRM? 
Considering various pros and cons of different security risk management approaches described in the 
previous section, we come up with the following reasons for choosing ISSRM as the framework for 
security risk management in this research: 
 The domain model of ISSRM clearly expresses the relationships between all the considered entities 
present in business process during risk assessment (see ISSRM domain model in figure 3). 
 ISSRM  model is compliant with the current security standards e.g. (Karagiannis, et al., 2007) 
 ISSRM comprises the complete risk management. In other words, it not only identifies and defines the 
risk, but also shows the risk mitigation techniques. 
 Current risk management approaches require existing Information Systems (IS) in order to perform 
risk analysis. In contrast, ISSRM is also applicable for developing future secured business process 
using patterns templates (Ahmed, et al., 2012). 
 
2.3 Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) 
2.3.1 ISSRM Domain Model 
 
Information System Security Risk management (ISSRM) (Dubois, et al., 2010) is methodological tool 
which assists organisations in making decisions related to the security of their Information Systems. 
ISSRM not only helps the security pattern development process, but also ensures their optimum usability.  
The domain model shown in Figure 3 delineates the main ISSRM concepts, their relationships and 
corresponding definitions. The model describes three principle groups of concepts: asset-related concepts, 
risk-related concepts and risk treatment-related concepts - marked with yellow, orange and green colours 
respectively. 
 
The first group, asset-related concepts describes the important assets - which need to be protected. The 
asset is comprised of two main types: the business asset – which is defined as information, process, and 
skill necessary for achieving organisation’s objectives; and IS asset – which has value to the organisation 
and supports business asset. Security criterion, such as confidentiality, integrity and availability 
characterise the security needs of business asset. 
 
The second group is risk-related concepts. Risk is a combination of event and impact. An event is another 
combination of a threat and one or more vulnerabilities - which leads to impact. Here the impact means an 
undesirable consequence of a risk which harms assets of an organisation when a threat is successfully 
accomplished. Threat exploits the weaknesses of the IS asset which are referred as vulnerabilities. A 
threat agent is someone with the ability to cause intentional harm to IS assets. Moreover, a threat agent 
uses attack method - a standard mean by which he executes threat. 
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                   Figure 3 ISSRM Domain Model adapted from (Dubois, et al., 2010) 
 
 
 
The third group is risk treatment- related concepts. Risk treatments are the decisions to treat the identified 
risks. Generally, each risk treatment fulfils a security need. The categories of risk treatment decisions 
include: risk avoidance - decision not to become available in a risk; risk reduction - action to reduce the 
probability of negative consequence; risk transfer - decision to share the burden of loss from a risk to 
another party; risk retention - accepting the burden of loss from a risk. The risk treatment is implemented 
by a designed mean to improve security, specified by a security requirement. A control represents the 
mean to improve the security by implementing security requirements. 
 
2.3.2 ISSRM Process 
 
ISSRM process (shown in Figure 4) describes the activities needed to identify, monitor and control 
security risk. Within the process, a risk is defined as any future events, which may prevent one from 
meeting the enterprises goals. This process helps to identify risk, quantify the impact and take actions to 
prevent it from occurring in the business process. 
 
ISSRM process is composed of six steps.The first step is dedicated to context and asset identification. It 
starts with the analysis of the organisation, its environment and assets - which need protection. It proceeds 
to the determination of security objectives (e.g. integrity, confidentiality or availability). Third step is risk 
analysis and assessment. This step’s purpose is to identify and estimate risks qualitative or quantitatively. 
Following is the risk treatment, which is an activity for selecting and implementing measures to modify 
 22 
 
the risk. Risk treatment includes risk control/mitigation, but also extends further to, for example, risk 
avoidance, risk transfer, risk retention etc. After this, the next step is performed to define security 
requirements, i.e. the security solutions to mitigate the risks. Finally, it is necessary to select and 
implement the countermeasures/controls within the enterprises business processes. 
 
 
    
           Figure 4 ISSRM Process, adapted from (Mayer, 2009) 
 
2.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we survey few security risk management approaches. We select the ISSRM domain model. 
It defines interdependencies between various security domain elements. The ISSRM process describes the 
way how the domain model could be applied. The knowledge gained from this chapter contributes to the 
research when enterprise business processes are analysed for security issues. 
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Chapter 3 Business Process Management 
 
Business process is a procedure which is found in business organisation. From purchasing a coffee from 
Starbucks to importing industrial goods from foreign country - all these activities go through a route of 
chained tasks, which is considered as business process. For maximising the profit in highly competitive 
business market, companies often focus on exploring and managing their own business processes – which 
is referred as Business Process Management (BPM). Business process analysts use different modelling 
languages to model the processes. In this chapter, we discuss about different modelling approaches which 
are currently being followed in business process management. We choose Business Process Modelling 
Notation (BPMN) (OMG, 2012) for analysing business processes for our research. In addition, we also 
show how BPMN and ISSRM could be used for performing business security risk analysis. 
 
3.1 Business Process Modelling Approaches 
Business processes present in modern companies are often complex and complicated than the past. So 
business analysts often use to model the processes by using different modelling languages to understand 
the processes clearly.  Following are some benefits of business process modelling (Ko, 2009): 
 Business process modelling language enhances the perceptibility and knowledge on company’s inner 
activities. 
 Business analyst’s quest for identifying bottlenecks in business process becomes an easy task by 
process modelling. 
 It helps to detect and identify potential areas - which need optimization. 
 Reduces delay or lead-times. 
 Business process modelling language describes who is responsible for what duty in a company. 
 Finally, it is an effective tool for fraud prevention and auditing of regulations compliance. 
Paradoxically, J.A. Zachman in his article ‘A Framework for Information System Architecture’ (Zachman, 
1987) contends that it is impossible for a single model to capture all the important features of a business 
enterprise. Each of the different modelling approaches has its own benefits and drawbacks. Stefan Haberl 
mentions a group of seven criteria for the evaluation of process modelling methodologies (Dufresne & 
Martin, 2003): 
 It should be capable of modelling all the complexities of business processes which include: 
sequencing, branching, looping, concurrency constructs (fork and synchronize), timeouts, exception 
handling etc. 
 It should have a method of distinguishing roles and assigning them the different duties. 
 A clear-cut graphical representation of the language should exist. 
 It should be able to show how a process could be undone. 
 It should describe how process instances can be started and followed throughout their execution. 
 It must possess the characteristics of good demonstration of the business process. It should be capable 
of raising the interests of external users, especially the interests of the business process analysts. 
 Lastly, the language should not mingle in details of communications protocols. 
 24 
 
Some of the process modelling languages are: 
 Flow charts (IBM, 1969) 
 Data Flow Diagrams (Draw, 2012) 
 Control Flow Diagrams 
 Unified Modelling Language (UML) (OMG, 2006) 
 Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN) (OMG, 2012) 
TV doesn’t turn on
Power cable 
is plugged in?
Plugin power 
cable
No
House has 
electricity?
Yes
Wait for 
electricity to 
come
No
Repair TV
Yes
Flowchart         
Order received
Product is delivered Invoice is sent
Advance payment
received
Unified Modelling 
Language (UML)          
System
Online buyer
Database
Order
Inquire output
Data Flow Diagram  
       Figure 5 Different Process Modelling Languages 
 
Although the former languages are still quite popular and widely being used, the latter two languages are 
gaining popularity day by day because of their compliance with previously mentioned criteria.  
 
3.2 Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN) 
 
Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN) is a language for developing and describing business 
process models. There are three main different levels (White, 2006)of process modelling. They are: 
Process Maps - which are flow charts of the business activities; Process Descriptions - additional 
information added on top of flow chart, but not sufficient for fully defining actual performance; and 
Process Models - additional information which can be used to simulate or execute the whole business 
process. BPMN addresses each of these levels, which is one of the big reasons behind its superiority over 
other process modelling languages. BPMN is developed by Business Process Management Initiative 
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(BPMI) (Group, 2008) and later merged with Object Management Group (OMG) (Group, 2012) - which 
now maintains it. The first specification BPMN 1.0 was released in May, 2004 (White, 2006). The latest 
version BPMN 2.0 was released to public in January 2011. 
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    Figure 6 Elements of BPMN (White, 2006)    
 
3.3 Why BPMN is needed for Security Analysis? 
 
Security risk analysis in business processes is important for information system development. The 
enterprises are vulnerable to potential security risks due to the nature of inherent risks in their routine 
operations and interactions with stakeholders (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2011). Detecting and perceiving 
the subtle relationships between the risks and vulnerabilities are essential for preparing risk mitigation 
solutions. In order to perform thorough and complete analysis, Business Process Modelling Notation 
(BPMN) is widely used for the understanding of internal business operations and their corresponding 
communications.  
 
3.4 Risk Analysis: Three-level Approach 
 
In this section, we show how a simple business process could be analysed with the help of BPMN and 
ISSRM for security risks by a three-level risk analysis method (Figure 7, 8, 9).  
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3.4.1 First Level: Process Modelling 
 
In the first level (Figure 7), a complete business process model is developed by using BPMN on the basis 
of a business process description. Most of the time, the entire business process is complex and lengthy. 
Therefore, a short part of a total business process is considered in this example for the ease of 
understanding. 
The following paragraph describes an example business process: 
 
 A company holds a couple of branches or subsidiaries around the world. The offshore branches need to 
keep frequent contact (e.g. exchanging documents, phone conversations between employees and so on) 
with their head office in order to perform their own business activities. In this modern digital era, instead 
of exchanging the documents in hard format, the head office and the branches prefer to exchange 
documents between them in digital format. Moreover, decision makers – who are sitting in the head office, 
take important decisions on the basis of the document’s data for selecting future business strategies. 
In first step, we draw this business process scenario using BPMN (Figure 7). Both of the employees 
working in Head office and one of the Branch offices are shown by using two separate pools. This part of 
the business process starts when an employee – who works in the off-shore branch office (upper pool), 
sends a document (e.g. .doc, .docx file ) to the head office - which is located in another country (lower 
pool). After it has been successfully received by the head office’s server, the employees (i.e. decision 
makers) retrieve the document using their computers and prepare it for later discussion in which they take 
business decision. After this, the process reaches to an end. It is essential to identify which one of these 
depicted activities is the most important. Among the three activities depicted here, the Make business 
decision activity could be considered having the top most importance, since on the basis of the outcome of 
business decision, the company operates in future. So, the company should ensure the integrity and 
perfection of this activity. 
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           Figure 7 First Level : Process modelling 
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          Figure 8 Second Level : Risk analysis 
 
3.4.2 Second Level: Risk analysis 
 
In this level (Figure 8), the main task is to analyse the business process scenario developed in the previous 
level for possible vulnerability and security breaches. How the integrity of the Make business decision 
activity could be breached? Generally, the head office employees assume that the document has arrived 
from their branch office by observing the email address, but they are unable to confirm that whether this 
was actually sent by the off-shore branch office employee - who is responsible for sending the document. 
It could happen that the off-shore branch office employee’s computer has been hacked by a hacker - who 
can send falsified data in order to cause harm to the company (shown in figure 9). Or, while transferring 
the document, the transmission medium could be intercepted by an adversary - who can modify the actual 
data of the document and send it to the receiving head office. After the risk has been identified (in this 
example, we consider the former risk), the next task is to find the exact IS asset in order to track the origin 
of the vulnerability present in the business process. In fact, the falsified document is first received by the 
server or the receiving interface of head office. So another separate lane:  Receiving interface is added to 
the Head office pool (Figure 8). 
 
3.4.3 Third Level: Security Requirement Elicitation 
 
In the third level (Figure 9), possible prevention method or technique is pursued in order to mitigate the 
vulnerability identified or discovered in the second level. After searching through security risk 
management literatures and related scenarios, it appears that digital signature scheme can help to mitigate 
this security risk. Under this scheme, before sending the document, the branch office employee needs to 
sign it digitally. Later, when the document is received by the head office’s receiving interface, the 
signature is verified. This ensures the identity and integrity of document. If the verification result is 
 28 
 
positive, the business process flow proceeds into the next activity. Otherwise, it becomes cancelled and 
reaches to an end. The security requirement ‘Verify the identity of digital document sender’ has been 
added in figure 9.   
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Figure 9 Third Level : Security requirement elicitation 
 
 
3.5 Alignment of BPMN with ISSRM 
 
In the previous analysis, BPMN proved its potential for business security risk analysis. In ‘Towards 
Definition of Secure Business Processes’ research paper, Altuhhova, Matulevičius and Ahmed aligned 
BPMN constructs with the elements of ISSRM (Altuhhova, et al., 2012) (Table 1). This relationship is a 
recent proposed idea, but this alignment helps risk analysts to scrutinise business processes using BPMN 
and the ISSRM framework. 
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Table 1 BPMN & ISSRM Alignment adapted from (Altuhhova, et al., 2012) 
The ISSRM domain 
model 
BPMN constructs Syntax 
A
ss
et
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el
at
ed
 c
o
n
ce
p
ts
 
Asset Combination of Flow Objects 
(Event, Gateway, Tasks) using 
sequence flow 
BFor Business assets
 
ISFor IS assets
 
  
IS
IS
B
B
 
Business asset Data object 
 
IS asset Data store 
Containers (Pool and Lanes)  
Po
o
l La
n
e 
1
La
n
e 
2
 
Security 
criteria (with 
Security 
objectives) 
 Lock sign consisting of three 
different values: 
 c - confidentiality 
 i- integrity 
 a - availability  
Locks can be associated with 
annotations 
c aii
 
 
Annotation
 
R
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k
-r
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ed
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o
n
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p
ts
 
Vulnerability Vulnerability point and 
Association Flow that points 
to Annotation 
Annotationnnotation
v
 
Attack method Combination of Flow Objects 
(Event, Gateway, Task) using 
Sequence Flow 
 
Impact Unlock sign consisting of 
three different values: 
 c - Breach of 
confidentiality 
 i - Breach of integrity 
 a - Breach of availability  
 
i ac
 
Threat agent Containers (Pool and Lanes) 
P
o
o
l
 
La
n
e
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Threat Combination of constructs for 
Threat agent and Attack 
method 
P
o
o
l
IS
 
Event Combination of construct for 
Threat and Vulnerability P
o
o
l
IS
 
Risk Combination of Event and 
Impact P
oo
l
Annotation
v
 
R
is
k
 
tr
ea
tm
en
t-
re
la
te
d
 
co
n
ce
p
ts
 
Risk treatment - - 
Security 
requirement 
Combination of Flow Objects 
using Sequence Flow (In this 
report, we simply use 
notations to define Security 
requirement) 
 
Control - - 
 
From the table, it is prominent that not all the elements of ISSRM could be aligned or mapped with 
BPMN constructs. Currently, BPMN 2.0 is being used by the business analysts. In future, additional 
constructs of BPMN can be proposed to fill up these gaps. 
 
3.6 Aligning Business Process Modelling and Security Requirements 
 
Generally, business analyst and security analyst collaborate with each other to address the security risks – 
which are present in the business process. By integrating security requirements when modelling the 
business process, we could address security at an early stage of business process development. In Figure 
10, we present a method to align business process modelling with security requirements. This method has 
total 7 steps. The rectangle boxes symbolise the output and inputs of the different steps. Boxes are marked 
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with two different colours in order to display their associations with two different groups (i.e. business 
analysts and security analysts).    
     
Security Analyst Business Analyst
6. Present security solutions
7. Rationalise security solutions
2. Analyse security risks
3. Elicit security requirements
4. Annotate business process 
model with security requirements
5. Feed back business models 
annotated with security requirements
1.Identify assets & 
security objectives
Business process model
Security requirements for business 
processes model
Business process model annotated 
with security requirements
Business process model annotated 
with security objectives
Security risk-oriented business 
process model
Security requirements for business 
process model
Business process model annotated 
with security requirements
Security risk-oriented business 
process model
 
                
        Figure 10 Alignment of business process modelling and security requirements 
 The steps of the aligning method are described below: 
1. Identify assets and security objectives. In this step, a business analyst introduces the business 
process model to a security analyst. They mutually share their ideas, opinions and comments to 
identify business and IS assets in the process model. Besides, they also define the security objectives 
for the identified assets.  
2.  Analyse security risks. The security analyst is solely responsible for performing this step. He uses 
risk analysis framework (e.g. ISSRM) in order to identify the potential threats, vulnerabilities and 
risks to the assets. The first and second levels of the three-level risk analysis approach – which is 
presented in section 3.4, could serve as a potential example of such security risk analysis. 
3.  Elicit security requirements. During this step, security analyst seeks for the risk treatment decisions 
in order to mitigate (i.e. reduce, avoid, transfer etc.) the identified risks.  
4. Annotate business process model with security requirements. Since the primary goal of business 
process models is to describe the process work-flow, therefore, the security analyst refrains from 
adding new modelling constructs (e.g. activity, gateway etc.) into the model to represent security 
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requirements. Instead, he uses annotations in the business process model to represent those 
requirements. 
5.  Feed back business models annotated with security requirements. In this step, security analyst 
gives back the business process model to the business analyst with security requirement annotated on 
it. At this point, the business analyst is able to realise the complete security need for his business 
process. 
6. Present security solutions. After receiving the annotated model from security analyst, the business 
analyst starts the initiative for fulfilling the proposed security requirements. However, security 
requirements come with a trade-off between cost, time and process complexity. Furthermore, a single 
security requirement can be fulfilled by using any of the multiple available solutions. Therefore, 
business analyst considers prioritising the security requirements and examining all the available 
security solutions presented by the security analyst.  
7.  Rationalise security solutions. Sometimes, it can be hard to prioritise the security requirements. In 
other words, without clear understanding of the risk consequences (i.e. impact of risk), it is difficult to 
choose between multiple security requirements. During this step, security analyst helps business 
analyst prioritise security requirements by providing him detail explanations and rationales.  
   
3.7 Summary 
 
This chapter presents the knowledge and technique on how an ordinary business process can be modelled 
and analysed for security risks using BPMN. The benefit of using BPMN as the language for analysis is 
explained at the beginning of the chapter. The three-level security analysis approach could be considered 
as a security risk analysis methodology. In addition, the alignment between BPMN and ISSRM helps to 
develop business processes and understand security requirements in parallel. This alignment is used for 
the development of Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP) in chapter 6. At the end of this chapter, a 
method is proposed for aligning Business Process Modelling with Security Requirements. This method 
could help to start addressing security risks at an early stage of business process development.  
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Chapter 4 Security Patterns 
 
In pattern-oriented software engineering, knowledge is collected from the relevant domain - which 
provides the basis for solving problems. The majority of software security issues often do not require new 
solutions. The developers reuse similar solutions - which are already successfully implemented by others 
to mitigate security risks. In this chapter, we discuss about patterns, the benefits of using pattern-based 
solution in software engineering and their domains. We also see how the security risks, vulnerabilities, 
solutions and controls can be presented in formal ways. This formal representation is referred as Security 
Pattern. The knowledge gained from the chapter helps to develop Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP) 
for our research. 
 
4.1 What is a Pattern? 
 
A pattern represents a proven solution of a problem - which arises within a certain context. In 1994, the 
work by the Gang-of-Four (Gamma, et al., 1994) proposed pattern as a ‘new concept’. Software 
developers hoped that patterns would help them to solve difficult problems with well-defined solutions. 
However, the scope of those patterns had only a small impact on total software or system architecture. 
This limitation was overcome by the POSA team (Schimidt, et al., 2000). Since then, patterns appear into 
many other specific areas such as: concurrent and networked systems, human-computer interaction, 
resource management etc. Security is another area of major interest for patterns and following is a 
definition of security pattern by researcher Markus Schumacher: 
 
“A security pattern describes a particular recurring security problem that arises in specific contexts, and 
presents a well-proven generic solution for it. The solution consists of a set of interacting roles that can be 
arranged into multiple concrete design structures, as well as a process to create one particular such 
structure.” (Schumacher, 2003) (Schumacher, et al., 2004) 
 
4.2 Advantages of Pattern-based Security 
There are many benefits which promote the use of security patterns in different domains (Schumacher, et 
al., 2004): 
 
 Security patterns describe basic security knowledge in a formal structured way. 
 Significant time is not required for the software developers to understand security pattern 
representation. 
 Using patterns to capture security knowledge helps to improve the integration of security into systems 
and enterprises, since patterns have been already being used to capture organisation and system 
engineering knowledge for quite a long period. 
 Finally, pattern emphasises not only on the solution, but also on the cause of the problem. 
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4.3 Pattern Domains 
Security patterns are applied in various areas of our life. Here, we discuss some notable pattern usage 
domains which are mentioned in (Schumacher, et al., 2004) 
 
Enterprise Security and Risk Management. Each and every enterprise has some missions, and it 
focuses on addressing security issues - which are related to these missions. The pattern addresses 
enterprise-wide security issues. Asset evaluation, vulnerability assessment, risk determination are the main 
aspects analysed by the patterns. 
 
Identification & Authentication (I&A). Pattern guides us to select the right solution when we have 
multiple available biometrics I&A alternatives. It helps the both security analysts to enforce constraints on 
system passwords, and the system users to select passwords for password authentication system. Face 
recognition, Iris recognition, Retinal scanning, Signature verification, PKI design variables, Speaker 
verification are some of the examples which can be successfully implemented using security patterns.  
  
Operating System Access Control. Pattern discusses about the authentication - which is needed during 
file access. It shows how a subject can be approved or authorised to gain access to an object in a specific 
way, and how to verify that the requestor is not an imposter.  
 
Firewall Architecture. Before selecting any firewall, it is required to consider the trades-offs between the 
speed, complexity and security of various types of firewalls such as: Packet filter firewall, Proxy-based 
firewall, Stateful firewall etc. The patterns describe all these different types of firewalls and guide people 
to select an appropriate firewall type for the system. 
 
Cryptographic Key Management. Cryptography ensures the integrity, confidentiality, authenticity and 
non-reputability in digital communications. The security patterns play the vital role for the selection and 
proper implementation of cryptographic algorithms. 
 
4.4 Pattern Documentation 
We present the pattern documentation format developed for the Pattern-Oriented Software Architecture 
series, because this format fits with our research objective and goal.  Some of the notable parts of a 
security pattern are: Name, Example, Context, Problem, Solution, Structure, Dynamics, Implementation, 
Example Resolved, Variants, Known Uses, and Consequences. (Yoshioka, et al., 2008) (Meszaros & 
Doble, 1997) Some of these important pattern parts are further explained below: 
 
Name. It is the foremost important part of any security pattern. It contains the name and a short summary 
of the pattern. 
 
Example. This part presents the real-world examples of a problem in order to prove the need for a security 
pattern.  
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Context. The context of security pattern describes the setting and conditions of vulnerable scenario. It is 
helpful for categorising security patterns. Such categorised patterns are required to ensure the total 
security of the vulnerable business process. 
 
Problem. A problem occurs whenever an asset, such as a system, or an application, is protected in an 
insufficient way against an attack. This part presents the problem for which pattern proposes the solution.  
 
Solution. Depending on the nature of the problem, pattern proposes the solution for the business process. 
This solution might suggest the potential modifications – which are required to be modified in one or more 
different levels of the business process.  
 
Structure. This part presents a detailed design of the structural aspects of a pattern. 
 
Consequences. A description of the benefits and demerits of a solution helps everybody to understand the 
consequences of applying a security pattern. This part of security pattern is useful to show how the 
security pattern could be applied in a wrong way.  This helps to warn everyone about the hidden pattern 
application dangers and motivates to choose another variant of the pattern. 
 
4.5 Security Risk-oriented Pattern Template 
Table 2 presents the Security Risk-oriented Pattern (SRP) template proposed by (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 
2011). The template is prepared by aligning the important parts of security patterns with the ISSRM 
components. We follow the guideline - proposed by (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2011), for instantiating this 
SRP template and use it to document ten Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP) for the research.  
Table 2 Security Risk-oriented Pattern Template adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2011) 
Entry Description 
Pattern name This represents the pattern and its security context. It helps to remember 
and refer to a particular pattern. Normally, the name of the secured 
business activity is stated here. 
Pattern Description It describes the potential pattern application scenario. This part includes 
information regarding the business activity, its input and outputs, and the 
circumstances in which it is applicable.  
A
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ed
 
co
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ts
 
Asset An asset is any valuable element which is necessary in accomplishing 
the organisation’s goal. 
Business asset A business asset can be the information, processes, or skills essential for 
business’s main operation. 
IS asset An IS asset supports business asset, and it is a component of IS. 
Security criterion A security criterion is a constraint on business asset, which is expressed 
through confidentiality, integrity and availability of business asset. 
R
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k
-
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d
 
co
n
ce
p
ts
 
Risk A risk is composed of event(s) and their deleterious impacts on one or 
more assets. 
Impact An impact is the potential bad consequences of a risk. 
Event An event is a combination of threat and vulnerability. 
Threat A threat agent initiates a threat by using attack method to harm one or 
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multiple IS assets by exploiting their vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerability A vulnerability is the weakness or flaw of IS asset. 
Threat agent A threat agent has means to cause harm to IS assets. 
Attack method An attack method is the technique using which a threat agent fulfils 
threat. 
R
is
k
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p
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Risk treatment A decision such as: avoidance, reduction, retention for risk mitigation.  
Security 
requirement 
Security requirement is the refined form of risk treatment decision. 
Control A control is the implementation of security requirements. 
Related pattern(s) The place for presenting information about the other related SRPs. 
 
4.6 Summary 
The chapter begins with a brief history of patterns in software engineering and with a definition of security 
patterns. We come to know about the advantages of using patterns-based security solution in security risk 
management. This motivates us for pursuing pattern-based security solution for mitigating business 
process security risks. In addition, the chapter focuses on the domains where patterns are being used, and 
we discover that we are already being benefited by utilising the patterns in enterprise security and risk 
management domain. The essential parts needed to document a security pattern are mentioned in detail. 
Above all, the chapter presents the Security Risk-oriented Pattern Template developed by (Ahmed & 
Matulevičius, 2011) . We use it for developing ten Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP) for the research. 
In the next chapter, we define the scope of SRP development by considering vulnerability classifications. 
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Chapter 5 Security Risk Classification 
 
There are numerous security risks present in IT field. Developing single Security Risk-oriented Pattern 
(SRP) to address each of these is a lengthy process. Therefore, before starting to develop the SRPs, we 
need to define the scope of their application area. We decide to address different security risk categories 
on the basis of vulnerability taxonomy. The main rationale is: vulnerabilities are the primary origins of 
security risks, and a group of vulnerabilities belong to the same category are responsible for causing 
similar risks. In this chapter, various vulnerability taxonomies are discussed, and then one of the 
taxonomies is selected as a classification paradigm.   
 
5.1 Vulnerability Taxonomies 
 
RISOS (Research Into Secure Operating Systems) project is one of the early studies of computer security 
and privacy. It proposes seven main categories of operating system security issues (R.Abbott, et al., 1975): 
 Incomplete Parameter Validation 
 Inconsistent Parameter Validation 
 Implicit Sharing of Privilege / Confidential Data 
 Asynchronous Validation / Inadequate Serialization 
 Inadequate Identification / Authentication / Authorization 
 Violable Prohibition / Limit 
 Exploitable Logic Error 
Later, Landwehr, Bull, McDermott and Choi classify vulnerabilities from three different perspectives. 
These perspectives are presented in figure 11 (Landwehr, et al., 1994). 
Genesis. By what means the problem comes into the system. 
Time. In which stage of the production cycle the problem moves into the system. 
Location. In which part of the system the problem is apparent. 
All these perspectives are later subdivided into different parts. In figure 11, three different colours: green, 
blue and orange represent three different levels of this classification. 
One of the major setbacks of this classification is the inability of classifying several existing 
vulnerabilities. For instance, vulnerability cannot be classified unless one does not know how it has 
entered into the environment. 
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      Figure 11 Vulnerability Classification by (Landwehr, et al., 1994) 
 
Tsipenyuk, Chess and McGraw find out that all the above mentioned schemas have several common 
limitations (Tsipenyuk, et al., 2005). First, the classification becomes ambiguous because of the wide 
coverage by the categories. Second, the implementation-level and design-level defects are not separately 
defined in these taxonomies. Third, the taxonomies are not consistent about outlining the categories with 
respect to the cause of the problem. In order to address all these above mentioned issues, later they suggest 
their own taxonomy - which is mentioned in ‘Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software 
Security Errors’ (Tsipenyuk, et al., 2005) 
 
5.2 Seven Pernicious Kingdoms of Vulnerability 
 
Tsipenyuk, Chess and McGraw use two distinct terminologies: Phylum and Kingdom. Phylum is defined 
as a certain type of coding error. For instance, ‘Buffer Overflow’ represents a phylum. On the other hand, 
a group of phyla - which share the same theme is considered as Kingdom. For example, ‘Errors’ is a 
Kingdom. The seven kingdoms are presented in Figure 12 by using purple coloured elliptical circles. In 
the same figure, there is also an additional kingdom represented by pink coloured circle, which covers the 
issues of software execution environment. 
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Figure 12 Seven Pernicious Kingdoms of Vulnerability (Tsipenyuk, et al., 2005) 
Following is a summary of all vulnerability categories or kingdoms from ‘Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A 
Taxonomy of Software Security Errors’ (Tsipenyuk, et al., 2005)  
Input Validation and Representation. Security issues belonging to this category arise because of 
trusting input from untrusted domain. XSS attacks, SQL injection, Buffer Overflow are some of the 
notable examples of this category. 
API Abuse. Application Programming Interface or API can be resembled as a joint between a caller and a 
callee. The abuse can take place when caller calls a callee based on an assumption or expectation - which 
is not fulfilled. For instance, the return of a non-random value by callee - inside the SecureRandom 
subclass, is an API abuse. 
Security Features. Software security does not mean security software. This kingdom mainly discusses 
about security types such as access control, cryptography, authentication etc. 
Time and State.  Modern computing is heavily based on distributed computing. It facilitates the sharing 
of huge amount of computational load by using resource located in different parts. However, this could 
cause unexpected interactions between concurrent running processes, threads and as well as information. 
Deadlock, Signal Handling Race Conditions and File Access Race Condition (aka TOCTOU) are some of 
the phyla belong to this kingdom. 
Errors. This kingdom comprises the errors - which occur in software. Most of the time, proper error 
handling remains absent, and this situation results in leaking out confidential information to unauthorised 
persons. Possible examples include: Empty Catch Block, Catching NullPointerException etc. 
Code Quality. Software programs developed by unskilled programmers suffer from bad quality of source 
code. This situation paves the way for the intruders to manipulate the behaviour of the programs. Memory 
leakage, Null deference, Uninitialized variables are some of the phyla included in this kingdom. 
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Encapsulation. Encapsulation hides one user’s data from another user, and creates division between 
validated and invalidated data. This kingdom deals with the problems such as: Trust boundary violation, 
System information leak etc. 
Environment. Finally, Tsipenyuk, Chess and McGraw create this kingdom to group various security 
vulnerabilities - which are not directly related to source code. However, considering these vulnerabilities 
is still important in order to ensure the security of software.  Insecure compiler optimization, missing error 
handling, weak access permissions are couple of the phyla described in this kingdom. 
 
5.3 Summary 
 
This chapter summarises few vulnerability taxonomies and classifications. We discuss vulnerability 
categories proposed by (R.Abbott, et al., 1975), (Landwehr, et al., 1994) and (Tsipenyuk, et al., 2005). 
Tsipenyuk, Chess and McGraw mention some of the common limitations of former two taxonomies. 
These limitations motivate us to select the vulnerability taxonomy model - mentioned in ‘Seven 
Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors’ (Tsipenyuk, et al., 2005), as the 
taxonomy paradigm for our research. We use this taxonomy to estimate the scope of Security Risk-
oriented Patterns (SRP) application area. This estimation is needed in order to develop SRPs - which 
address different risks arising due to each of the seven vulnerability categories mentioned in the taxonomy 
paradigm. In the next chapter, we present the SRPs in textual format and also by using BPMN diagrams. 
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Chapter 6 Security Risk-Oriented Patterns 
 
We present ten Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP) in this chapter. Their textual description is given by 
using Security Risk-oriented Pattern Template proposed by (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2011). These 
patterns are modelling language-independent. We use Business Processes Modelling Notation (BPMN) to 
represent them graphically too. While preparing the diagrams, we use BPMN extensions proposed by 
(Altuhhova, et al., 2012) to overcome the limitations of BPMN in security analysis. Each Security Risk-
oriented Pattern is composed of a textual description and three diagrams: Example business process, 
Potential threat analysis, and Annotated security requirement. The Example business process diagram 
represents an instance of a vulnerable business process. The Potential threat analysis diagram explains 
how an attacker could launch an attack to the vulnerable business process. Lastly, Annotated business 
process diagram represents the same Example business process diagram, but it is annotated with security 
requirement – which is proposed by the corresponding SRP.  
6.1 SRP1: Securing data that flow between the business entities 
 
E-business heavily depends on transferring data packets from one computer to another through Internet-
which is insecure (Otuteye, 2003). Online banking, shopping, ticket purchase are some notable examples 
of e-business. Companies doing e-business should ensure the confidentiality of client’s private data 
(Velmurugan, 2009). This security pattern addresses the security risk in online data transmission. 
1. Organisational scenario & Security context identification 
Pattern name Securing data that flow between the business entities 
Pattern description This pattern secures the data transmit between the business entities i.e. 
stakeholders involved in the business process. 
Related pattern(s) No related patterns 
2.  Asset identification & Security objective determination 
Business Asset Data which is submitted and employed by business 
IS Asset Input interface, Transmission medium that transfers data and  business/server 
Security criteria  Confidentiality of data  
 Integrity of data 
3. Risk analysis & assessment 
Risk An attacker intercepts the transmission medium due to its characteristics to 
be intercepted and manipulates the data leading to loss of data confidentiality 
or integrity. 
Impact  Harm of at least one business asset (i.e. harm of data submitted and 
stored in the database) 
 Harm of at least one IS asset (i.e. loss of reliability of the transmission 
medium) 
 Negation of security criteria (i.e. negation of data confidentiality and 
integrity) 
Event An attacker intercepts the transmission medium due to its characteristics to 
be intercepted and misuses the data due to the lack of crypto-functionality at 
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           Figure 13 Example business process 
In figure 13, a client uses the input interface in order to send data to a business which later employs the 
data for performing activities in the business process. While travelling through any wired or wireless 
medium, data can be intercepted by any unauthorised third party (Barnum, 2007).  
the input interface and server (Tsipenyuk, et al., 2005). 
Threat An attacker intercepts the transmission medium and manipulates the data. 
Vulnerability  Characteristics of transmission medium to be intercepted (Tsipenyuk, et 
al., 2005). 
 Lack of crypto-functionality at input interface and server (Tsipenyuk, et 
al., 2005). 
Threat agent An attacker with means to intercept transmission medium by acting as a 
proxy  
Attack method  Intercept transmission medium by establishing a proxy between input 
interface and server (Barnum, 2007) (Project, 2009). 
 Misuse data: 
(a) Capture, modify and pass data to the database.  
(b) Capture, read and keep data for the later use. 
4. Risk treatment & Security requirements 
Risk treatment Risk reduction 
Security requirement  Make data unreadable to attackers. (Mitigates the risk of data 
confidentiality) 
 Verify the received data with the original. (Mitigates the risk of data 
integrity)  
Control  Cryptographic algorithm  
 Checksum algorithm  
Risk treatment Risk avoidance 
Security requirement Change the transmission medium which does not have the ability to be 
intercepted 
Control  Client physically delivers the data to company. 
 Data have to be saved by company’s employee. 
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           Figure 14 Potential threat analysis 
Figure 14 shows the security risk which arises when an attacker intercepts the transmission medium and 
submits wrong data into the transmission medium again. In figure 15, we annotate the necessary security 
requirements: ‘Make data unreadable to attackers’ - which mitigates the risk of confidentiality, and 
‘Verify the received data with the original’ - which mitigates the risk of losing data integrity.                                 
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 Figure 15 Annotated security requirement 
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6.2 SRP2: Securing input interface for allowing valid data enter into the business 
process 
 
The biggest problems in software security exist because software takes inputs from outside (McGraw, 
2006) (Gegick & Williams, 2006).When developing software for an IT system, the developer should not 
trust any data coming from outside into the system (Viega & Messier, 2003). Business enterprises largely 
suffer from SQL injection (Project, 2011), Cross-site scripting (XSS) (Auger, 2011), XPath Injection 
(Project, 2009) and various other attacks involving malicious inputs.  
1. Organisational scenario & Security context identification 
Pattern name Securing input interface for allowing valid data enter into the business 
process. 
Pattern description This security pattern ensures data validity and rejects unwanted data when it 
enters into business process. 
Related pattern(s) No related patterns 
2. Asset identification & Security objective determination 
Business Asset Business process which is executed after the data submission. 
IS Asset Input interface 
Security criteria  Availability of the business process. 
 Integrity of the business process. 
3. Risk analysis & assessment 
Risk An attacker submits data and malicious script because input interface does not 
inspect entering inputs thus leading to the compromise of input interface and 
loss of integrity or/and availability of the business process. 
Impact  Integrity of the business activities is broken (e.g. costing business both 
financially and socially for personal gains). 
 Input interface is compromised. 
 Alter business activities because the required activities are not available. 
Event Attacker submits data and malicious script through input interface which 
doesn’t inspect incoming data. 
Threat An attacker submits the data and malicious script. 
Vulnerability Input interface does not inspect data inflow. 
Threat agent An attacker who is capable of writing malicious scripts. 
Attack method  Submits data and malicious script.  
 Malicious script changes the business process either breaking its 
execution or changing the rules of the process. 
4. Risk treatment & Security requirements 
Risk treatment Risk avoidance 
Security requirement Only accept incoming data in predefined format. 
Control  Input validation - satisfies the required criteria (Jeremiah & Anton, 2007). 
 Input sanitization - transforms the input to an acceptable format (Jeremiah 
& Anton, 2007) 
 Input filtration - blocks or allows part of input data based on the 
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In figure 16, the data is flowing from outside into the system. On the basis of this data, the business 
activity is carried on. Next, figure 17 shows that an attacker is sending malicious data to nullify the 
integrity and availability of the business activity.  
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     Figure 17 Potential threat analysis 
 
acceptable criteria (Jeremiah & Anton, 2007).  
 Input canonicalization - converts the input data from possible 
representations to a standard canonical representation acceptable to the 
application (Clarke, 2009). 
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     Figure 18 Annotated security requirement 
 
We annotate the figure 18 with security requirement, and propose to accept all incoming data into 
predefined format - which includes input filtering, sanitizing, and canonicalization.  
 
6.3 SRP3: Protecting the integrity of business activity by securing receiving interface 
 
In earlier days, we could easily verify the identity of the sender of a paper document by examining the 
signature of the sender. This signature validation property is important in this age of electronic mail too 
(Rivest, et al., 1978). For ensuring mutual trust in e-business, we should also make sure the actual sender 
of a document cannot deny that he indeed has sent the digital document. This is often referred as 
‘nonrepudiation’ (Security, 2001). 
1. Organisational scenario & Security context identification 
Pattern name Protecting the integrity of business activity by securing receiving interface  
Pattern description Companies often make their business decision on the basis of data coming 
from outside of their own business process. If the data origin is not properly 
verified, then the decision taken on basis of it may prove wrong. The goal of 
this security pattern is to protect the integrity of company’s decision making 
skill by securing receiving interface.  
Related pattern(s) No related pattern 
2. Asset identification & Security objective determination 
Business Asset Business activity 
IS Asset Receiving interface    
Security criteria Integrity of  business activity  
3. Risk analysis & assessment 
Risk A company faces financial loss because of implementing incorrect strategies 
based on falsified digital document - which comes inside into business 
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     Figure 19 Example business process     
   
In figure 19, we try to illustrate the scenario: an employee of a company is receiving data coming from 
outside of the company. On the basis of the received data, later he takes business decision.     
process through its receiving interface - which does not verify sender’s 
identity. 
Impact  The integrity of decision making skill becomes compromised.  
 Receiving interface becomes target of future attacks.  
 Company selects wrong strategy which fails to generate revenue. 
 As a result, it faces financial loss. 
Event An attacker sends false digital document through company’s receiving 
interface - which does not verify the document sender’s identity. 
Threat By pretending to be a genuine sender, an attacker sends fallacious digital 
document to a company.  
Vulnerability Receiving interface does not verify digital document sender’s identity (Pragar 
& Bingiganavale, 2003) 
Threat agent An attacker who is able to pretend as a genuine sender of digital document. 
Attack method  An attacker prepares falsified digital document. 
 Then, he passes it as an input into a company’s internal business process 
through vulnerable receiving interface. 
4. Risk treatment & Security requirements 
Risk treatment Risk reduction 
Security requirement Verify the identity of digital document sender (Shaw, 2001). 
Control Digital signature scheme (Katz, 2007) (Katz, 2010). 
Risk treatment Risk avoidance 
Security requirement Stop exchanging data in electronic format. 
Control Hard copy data bearing sender’s signature. 
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Figure 20 Potential threat analysis 
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           Figure 21 Annotated security requirement 
Figure 20 explains when an attacker - disguising himself as a genuine document sender, sends false or 
manipulated data. Since the receiver assumes that the document is coming from the actual sender - 
probably by looking at the email domain, later he performs the next business activity on the basis of false 
data. As a result, the company faces financial loss. In figure 21, we annotate the security requirement 
which suggests for addressing this security risk by the verification of sender’s digital signature at the 
receiving interface. 
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6.4 SRP4: Protecting IS from Denial Of Service (DOS) attack 
 
Denial of Service (DOS) attack is one of the common major security problems in IT field (Loukas & Oke, 
2009) (Zhang, et al., 2010). It occurs when a company’s server runs out of resources - which are required 
in order to offer services to the users (University, 2001). There are many variants of DOS attacks 
techniques present in IT field (Zhang, et al., 2010) (Eddy, 2007) (Leyden, 2008). This SRP is developed 
for analysing and addressing these DOS attacks. 
 
 
1. Organisational scenario & Security context identification 
Pattern name Protecting IS from Denial Of Service (DOS) attacks 
Pattern description Denial Of Service (DOS) attack prevents legitimate users from using service 
provided by business and leads to downtime, thus service consumers lose 
confidence in that business. The goal of this security pattern is to ensure the 
availability of business service. 
Related pattern(s) No related pattern 
2. Asset identification & Security objective determination 
Business Asset Offered service 
IS Asset Server database 
Security criteria Availability of service 
3. Risk analysis & assessment 
Risk An attacker performs DOS attack i.e. causes the offered service become 
unavailable to the users, through exploiting intentionally created half-open 
(Baccala, 1997) connections by sending false messages to the server database 
- which allows unlimited number of TCP connections. 
Impact  Availability of the service is compromised  
 In some cases, server database runs out of memory, crashes, or becomes 
inoperative.  
Event Attacker exploits intentionally created half-open connections by sending 
false messages to the server database - which allows unlimited number of 
TCP connections. 
Threat Attacker can exploit intentionally created half-open connections by sending 
false messages to the server database. 
Vulnerability Server TCP implementation allows unlimited number of connections 
(CISCO, n.d.). 
Threat agent An attacker capable of initiating new connections in a faster rate than the 
victim system can fulfil the pending connections.  
Attack method Attacker uses client software which creates too many half-open connections 
(Baccala, 1997) to the victim server. 
4. Risk treatment & Security requirements 
Risk treatment Risk reduction 
Security requirement Install IP filtering to restrict internal incoming and outgoing packets.  
Control Proper router configuration. 
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              Figure 22 Example business process  
In figure 22, a business is accepting outside request and offering services in reply. It could be online 
banking service, medical service, ticket booking service etc. All these types of services are desired to be 
available all the time. However, figure 23 shows how an attacker intentionally keeps requesting the same 
service multiple times by opening numerous half-open connections (Baccala, 1997) at the same time.    
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Figure 23 Potential threat analysis 
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          Figure 24 Annotated security requirement 
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Most of the time, resource limitation imposes the restriction on server for accepting limited number of 
connections. As a result too many half-open connections are likely to cause the system to become 
unresponsive, which negates the constant service provided by the company server. Finally we add the 
necessary security requirement in figure 24.  
 
6.5 SRP5: Applying multilevel access rights to retrieval interface 
 
Employees often need to access data from company database in order to perform daily jobs. On the other 
hand, companies also need to protect their confidential information from unauthorised person; otherwise 
they might face financial risk (Smith, 2006). As a solution, in many companies, especially in military 
services (Stamp & Hushyar, 2006), the data are categorised into different levels according to different 
types of access rights.  
1. Organisational scenario & Security context identification 
Pattern name Applying multilevel access rights to retrieval interface 
Pattern description This patterns describes how data can be protected from misuse by using 
Multi-Level Security (MLS) (Anderson, 2008) 
Related pattern(s) No related pattern 
2. Asset identification & Security objective determination 
Business Asset Data 
IS Asset Retrieval interface 
Security criteria Confidentiality of data  
3. Risk analysis & assessment 
Risk A company’s confidential data fall into the hand of an unauthorised person 
because one of its internal employees has access to the interface - which 
displays all the data without any restrictions.  
Impact  Confidentiality of data is negated. 
 Retrieval interface becomes target of future attacks.  
 Data can be forwarded to another unauthorised person. 
Event An employee accesses company data through its retrieval interface - which 
does not support data access protocol and retrieves confidential data.  
Threat An employee accesses company data through its retrieval interface and 
retrieves confidential data. 
Vulnerability Retrieval interface does not have data access protocol. 
Threat agent An employee unauthorised to read confidential data. 
Attack method  Launch the retrieval interface. 
 Retrieve available data from database. 
4. Risk treatment & Security requirements 
Risk treatment Risk reduction 
Security requirement Restrict access to confidential data and provide access to relevant data (Bell, 
2005) 
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Figure 25 is presenting a data retrieving scenario by an employee. Figure 26 shows a rouge employee is 
accessing confidential data - which he or she should not read, using the retrieval interface. The retrieve 
request is being executed in the database and the retrieved data is sent back to wicked employee (i.e. 
attacker).  
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            Figure 26 Potential threat analysis 
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            Figure 27 Annotated security requirement 
In order to avoid this security risk, the retrieval interface should check every data access request and grant 
access according to the corresponding employee’s data access right. This security requirement is 
annotated in figure 27. 
Control Multi-Level Security (MLS)  protocol  (Beckwith, et al., 2004) 
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6.6 SRP6: Securing data confidentiality from unauthorised person in a data store 
 
Attacker can use malicious inputs (e.g. SQL scripts, malicious XPaths (Project, 2009)) to divulge 
confidential data from an enterprises system database (Sen, 2007) (Ragan, 2011). He might use the secret 
data for stealing money, performing social engineering or even become financially benefited by passing it 
to a third party.   
1. Organisational scenario & Security context identification 
Pattern name Securing data confidentiality from unauthorised person in a data store 
Pattern description This security pattern secures a data store by storing confidential data in 
encrypted format (Security, 2002) 
Related pattern(s) No related pattern 
2. Asset identification & Security objective determination 
Business Asset Data 
IS Asset Data store 
Security criteria Confidentiality of  data  
3. Risk analysis & assessment 
Risk A company faces financial loss because of losing confidential information 
acquired from unencrypted data stolen from its data store by an attacker 
through SQL command execution (McMillan, 2011) 
Impact  The confidentiality of data becomes compromised. 
 Data store becomes the target for more future attack. 
This impact could provoke the following impacts: 
 Attacker can pass company’s secret data to its opponents in order to be 
financially benefited. 
 Client and stakeholders lose confidence on company’s privacy policy. 
 Company may even face financial loss in future. 
Event An attacker reveals information from retrieved data - which was stored in 
unencrypted format into data store, by SQL command execution. 
Threat An attacker retrieves data from data store by executing SQL commands. 
Vulnerability Confidential parts of data are not encrypted in data store. 
Threat agent An attacker who has or acquired unauthorised access to data store. 
Attack method Retrieve data from data store by executing SQL command (Project, 2011). 
4. Risk treatment & Security requirements 
Risk treatment Risk reduction 
Security requirement Make confidential data invisible to unauthorised person. (Corporation, 2001) 
Control  Use of cryptographic algorithm (Knudsen, 1998) 
 Use of hashing algorithm 
Risk treatment Risk avoidance 
Security requirement Do not store confidential data into data store. 
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In figure 28, a business process is acquiring data from outside and saving it to the database.  In case an 
attacker (figure 29) becomes successful in stealing the secret data from the database by SQL injection, or 
XPath injection, he might be able read and interpret the confidential information (e.g. credit card numbers, 
password, username, address etc.) (Lemon, 2008) (Keizer, 2008).  
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                Figure 29 Potential threat analysis 
So, in order to be in the safe side, it is advisable to encrypt confidential data before storing it to a database. 
We have annotated this security requirement in figure 30.  If this requirement is met, then even if an 
attacker becomes successful stealing secret data, he will not be able to decipher it.   
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          Figure 30 Annotated security requirement 
Control Acquire data directly from the user when necessary. 
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6.7 SRP7: Securing business activity from deadlock condition 
 
‘Deadlock’ condition represents a situation when two concurrent running processes wait for each other to 
be finished (Padua, 2011). In case of long waiting time, the web service provided by an enterprise 
becomes unavailable to the user. Therefore, before designing any system, the designers should be aware of 
any possibilities of potential deadlock (Havender, 2010). 
1. Organisational scenario & Security context identification 
Pattern name Securing business activity from deadlock condition 
Pattern description This security pattern avoids the deadlock condition and describes a 
mechanism to handle multiple requests in parallel. 
Related pattern(s) No related patterns 
2. Asset identification & Security objective determination 
Business Asset Business activity 
IS Asset Server database 
Security criteria Availability of the business activity 
3. Risk analysis & assessment 
Risk An attacker causes the business activity to become unavailable for indefinite 
time by triggering multiple actions to server database - which does not follow 
consistent locking discipline for accessing system resource, thus leading to 
deadlock condition in the system. 
Impact  Availability of the business activity is compromised.  
 Server database crashes due to deadlock condition. 
Event An attacker triggers multiple actions to server database - which does not 
follow consistent locking discipline for accessing system resource, and leads 
to deadlock condition in the system. 
Threat An attacker is able to trigger multiple actions which can create deadlock 
condition into the system. 
Vulnerability Absence of consistent locking discipline in server database (Tsipenyuk, et al., 
2005). 
Threat agent Attacker having knowledge of system API and resources (Dalci, 2007) 
Attack method  Attacker triggers an action which uses systems resource.  
 Next, he initiates next action which waits for the former action to 
complete, but the former action waits for another resource. Thus he 
creates a ‘hold and wait’ condition. (Coffman, et al., 1971) (Dalci, 2007) 
 
4. Risk treatment & Security requirements 
Risk treatment Risk reduction 
Security requirement  Required processes should request all the resources before starting up.  
 Required processes should release all their resources before requesting 
further more resources.  
Control  Serialising tokens 
 All-or-none algorithms 
Risk treatment Risk avoidance 
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          Figure 31 Example business process 
In figure 31, client requests are being received by the server and then it performs actions. In figure 32, an 
attacker initiates a request and the server is working to fulfil it. While the process of fulfilment is still in 
progress, the attacker initiates the second request - which waits for the first request to be fulfilled. If the 
server waits for some other resource to complete the first request, then the waiting time for the second 
request will be too long, thus the server might experience a deadlock situation.  
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    Figure 32 Potential threat analysis   
 
To protect business process from deadlock risk, we mark figure 33 with necessary security requirement. 
We recommend that each business process activity should request all necessary resources before execution. 
This will ensure that no process waits unnecessarily for extra system resource.  
Security requirement Advance resource allocation technique for required process.  
Controls  Banker's algorithm (Tannenbaum, 1987) 
 Wait/Die and Wound/Wait algorithms (Özsu & Valduriez, 2011) utilizes 
symmetry-breaking technique 
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Figure 33 Annotated security requirement 
 
6.8 SRP8: Ensuring atomicity of business transactions to protect data integrity 
 
Process atomicity ensures the separation or isolation from other parallel running processes (MSDN, 2010). 
An atomic operation can have two possible consequences: either it is successful in changing the state of 
resource, or in case of failure, it does not have any affect into the resource (Lo, 2005). Transactional 
business processes such as: Mobile recharge, money transfer, online shopping etc. require process 
atomicity for ensuring data consistency (Lodde, et al., 2011).    
1. Organisational scenario & Security context identification 
Pattern name Ensuring atomicity of business transactions to protect data integrity 
Pattern description This security pattern addresses the atomicity of business transaction in order 
to ensure that the manipulated data is committed only after a successful 
transaction. 
Related pattern(s) No related patterns 
2. Asset identification & Security objective determination 
Business Asset Business transaction  
IS Asset Server database  
Security criteria Integrity of business transaction 
3. Risk analysis & assessment 
Risk A company’s business transaction loses its integrity by an attacker who 
causes business activity failure or causes the activity to abort in abnormal 
way in a server database which does not have proper resource shutdown or 
release mechanism or having poor error handling, thus ending up writing 
conflicting data into database.  
Impact  Integrity of the transaction is compromised.  
 Broker ends up with chained or bundled transactions. 
 Buyers become forced to perform aggregate transactions. 
 Optional transactions occur during procurement (Wang & Das, 2001). 
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Figure 34 Example business process 
Figure 34 represents a common scenario where a web transaction is performed on the basis of received 
parameters from the system user. In case there is an absence of proper input filtering, the transaction might 
fail when an attacker supplies invalid parameter values (figure 35) (McGraw, 2006) (Gegick & Williams, 
2006). Eventually, that particular transaction process may end up raising an exception and we should 
Event An attacker is able to cause business activity failure or causes the activity to 
abort in abnormal way in a server database which does not have proper 
resource shutdown or release mechanism or having poor error handling, thus 
ending up writing conflicting data into database.  
Threat An attacker is able to cause business activity failure or causes the activity to 
abort in abnormal way in server database. 
Vulnerability  Improper Resource Shutdown or Release (Classification, 2012).   
 Poor error handling (Tsipenyuk, et al., 2005).  
Threat agent An attacker with the ability of consuming, destroying, or disrupting an 
activity or resource required to perform a normal business transaction. 
Attack method Depending on the nature of the resource the attacker may use these following 
methods to make the target  process unavailable by gaining some privileges 
on the system: (Classification, 2012) 
 Resource Depletion through Flooding 
 Resource Depletion through Allocation   
 Resource Depletion through Leak   
 Denial of Service through Resource Depletion  
4. Risk treatment & Security requirements 
Risk treatment Risk reduction 
Security requirement Process and data should be recovered by implementing an external 
transaction tracking mechanism (Cobb, 1997).  
Control  Proper exception handling. 
 Implement standard compensation logic.  
Risk treatment Risk reduction 
Security requirement Install IP filtering to filter or restrict internal incoming and outgoing packets. 
Controls Proper router configuration  
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make sure to implement external mechanism - which will help the process to roll-back to its previous 
stage (figure 36).   
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Figure 35 Potential threat analysis      
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        Figure 36 Annotated security requirement 
 
 
6.9 SRP9: Protecting data integrity in Time Of Check Time Of Use (TOCTOU) 
situation 
 
One of the conspicuous features of distributed and parallel computing is resource sharing and multi-
tasking (Butelle & Coti, 2011). However, this feature can also turn into a system risk (e.g. race condition) 
if there is no defined mechanism on accessing shared resource by multiple process threads (Chen, 2006).  
1. Organisational scenario & Security context identification 
Pattern name Protecting data integrity in Time Of Check Time Of Use (TOCTOU) 
situation.  
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Pattern description This pattern describes how data integrity can be protected in TOCTOU  
(Bishop & Dilger, 1996) (Enumeration, 2011) (Project, 2009) scenario. 
Related pattern(s) No related pattern 
2. Asset identification & Security objective determination 
Business Asset Data 
IS Asset Server database 
Security criteria Integrity of data  
3. Risk analysis & assessment 
Risk A company’s data integrity becomes compromised because of a group of 
threat agents perform concurrent operations on the same data from different 
locations to a server database which does not support atomic operation or 
locking mechanism on data. 
Impact  Integrity of data is compromised. 
 Disruption occurs in server databases normal operation. 
 Attackers become financially benefited (Library, 2012).  
 Company faces financial loss (Library, 2012).   
Event A group of separately located threat agents perform parallel manipulations on 
same data - where the server database does not support atomic operation or 
locking mechanism on it. 
Threat A group of threat agents concurrently manipulate the same data from 
different locations. 
Vulnerability  System operations are not atomic i.e. there is time gap between resource 
check and resource usage (Bratus, et al., 2008) 
 Absence of locking mechanism during data access. 
Threat agent A group of attackers, who have access to same data. 
Attack method  Initiate simultaneous sessions. 
 Perform concurrent data manipulation. 
4. Risk treatment & security requirements 
Risk treatment Risk reduction 
Security requirement Implement locking protocol on data access (Enumeration, 2011). 
Control Lock file mechanism. (Wheeler, 2004) 
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        Figure 37 Example business process 
Figure 37 represents a process where a server receives a client request, and then it checks the current value 
of a parameter from its database and updates it by adding the value received in the request. Figure 38 
shows an event when this simple process is initiated multiple times by concurrent requests from attackers, 
and due to race condition, the parameter value is not properly updated. In order to avoid this security risk, 
we should implement proper locking protocol on data access. This security requirement is marked in 
figure 39.   
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               Figure 38 Potential threat analysis 
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         Figure 39 Annotated security requirement 
 
6.10 SRP10: Preventing System Information Leakage 
 
System automation speeds up the process execution and reduces the overall process duration. However, 
during system failure, the software - which automatically runs the system, passes error reports to the 
system user. The error reports help the system developers to detect, identify and solve the bugs in the 
system (Office, 2008).  These reports often contain confidential data which can help an attacker to become 
familiar about internal configuration of the system and devise sophisticated future attacks (Office, 2008) 
(Enumeration, 2011).                   
1. Organisational scenario & Security context identification 
Pattern name Preventing System Information Leakage  
Pattern description This pattern describes how to prevent confidential server and database 
information from attacker when an exception is raised in the system. 
Related pattern(s) No related pattern 
2. Asset identification & Security objective determination 
Business Asset System internal information 
IS Asset Server database 
Security criteria Confidentiality of system internal information  
3. Risk analysis & assessment 
Risk An attacker becomes capable of launching sophisticated attacks by acquiring 
confidential system internal information gained through intentionally raised 
exception in a vulnerable server. (Tsipenyuk, et al., 2005) 
Impact  Confidentiality of system internal information is lost.  
 Acquired information can be used to launch more sophisticated future 
attacks against server database. 
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Figure 40 Example business process 
Figure 40 shows a part of a web service process. Here, a server of a company receives a request from 
outside client, performs some operations using the parameters received in the request, and sends back the 
results to the request origin.  
Event An attacker gains system internal information by generating runtime 
exception by providing invalid inputs to a vulnerable server which is not 
properly configured for smart error handling.  
Threat An attacker tires to gain system internal information by generating exception. 
Vulnerability  Absence of exception handling techniques or detailed error handling in 
servlets. (Project, 2007) 
 Server is not properly configured for exception management. (Auger, 
2010) 
Threat agent An attacker who searches for system internal information. 
Attack method  Uses input interface in order to establish session with company server. 
 Tries to generate exception by providing invalid inputs. 
4. Risk treatment & Security requirements 
Risk treatment Risk reduction 
Security requirement Address error and exception wisely. 
Control  Servlet source code should implement adequate unexpected exception 
handling. (Papa, 2012) 
 Perform static code review. 
 Configure server for using custom error pages. (Support, 2006) (Shaw, 
2010) 
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Figure 41 Potential threat analysis 
In figure 41, an attacker passes malicious input as a request to the server. The request is successfully 
received, however while performing the operation - which depends on the input, the process raises an 
exception and fails to execute further. Finally, since, there was no proper exception handling mechanism 
present, the system sends back the confidential debugging information to the user of the web service i.e. 
the attacker.  
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            Figure 42 Annotated security requirement 
In figure 42, we suggest to address system error and exception carefully. 
 
6.11 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we become familiar with ten Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP). SRPs are associated 
with textual and graphical description for the facilitation of their usability. Later, these patterns are used in 
order to identify the presence of risks in the business process models. SRPs also help to define appropriate 
security countermeasures.  
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Chapter 7 Pattern Application 
 
In previous chapter, we presented ten Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP). However, still we do not 
know how we can use these. In this chapter, we propose the guidelines for applying SRPs in business 
processes. The guideline consists of four major steps (figure 43): Occurrence identification, Security 
criterion annotation, Security risk requirement annotation, and Security requirement rationalisation.  
Occurrence identification
Security criterion annotation
Security risk requirement annotation
Security requirement rationalisation
 
      Figure 43 Steps of SRP application guideline 
7.1 Step One: Occurrence identification 
 
In the first step, we manually identify the occurrence of SRP in a business process model. This action 
requires good understanding of process domain and security risk. In figure 44, we show a matched part of 
a case study business process model (Figure 44 (b)) and the example business process diagram of 
SRP1(Figure 44 (a)).  A short comparative analysis reveals the correspondence between ‘Submit data’ 
(Figure 44 (a)) and ‘T1 Log on to portal’ (Figure 44 (b)) activities. A good rationale could be: both of 
these activities deal with data - which enter using input interfaces. Similarly, we also discover the 
correspondence between tasks ‘Employ data’ (Figure 44 (a)) and ‘T2 Validate user’ (Figure 44 (b)), 
because both of these tasks use data after getting it from input interfaces. 
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(a) Example business process of SRP1                        (b)  Part of a case study business process model 
        Figure 44 Step 1 Occurrence Identification 
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7.2 Step Two: Security criterion annotation 
 
After finding a matched occurrence from the case study, we identify the vulnerable asset and annotate it 
with the security criterion. We get the security criterion from the ‘example business process’ diagram of 
SRP1. In this case, ‘User Log on Details’ is annotated with lock signs (Figure 45) to emphasise that its 
confidentiality and integrity require protection. 
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           Case study process model is marked with security criteria 
    Figure 45 Step 2 Security criterion annotation 
7.3 Step Three: Security risk requirement annotation 
 
Next, we use BPMN annotation stencil to annotate security requirements (Figure 46). We get the security 
requirement from the ‘annotated security requirement’ diagram of SRP1. If we have more than one 
security risk requirement, we have to mark both of them. This creates an option for the decision makers to 
choose between two available choices. Alternatively, we could also use the combinations of task, event, 
and gateway constructs to complete this step (Altuhhova, et al., 2012). 
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Figure 46 Step 3 Security risk requirement annotation 
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7.4 Step Four: Security requirement rationalisation 
 
Finally, we use the potential threat analysis diagram of the SRP1 to show what security breach could 
occur if one does not fulfil the proposed security risk requirement (Figure 47).  This helps the decision 
makers to decide which one of the security requirements is more important and needs to be satisfied 
before the other one. 
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(a) Potential threat analysis diagram of  SRP1      (b) Threat analysis in case study process model 
Figure 47 Step 4 Security requirement rationalisation 
7.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we present the guideline for applying Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP) in business 
processes. We elaborately describe the steps of SRP application guideline which consists of four steps. 
First, we demonstrate how we are able to identify a particular SRP occurrence in a business process model 
with the help of example business process diagram of that particular SRP. We pinpoint the matches 
between the SRP and the given business process model, and mention the reasons for considering it as a 
SRP occurrence. Second, we identify valuable asset and annotate it with security criterion to emphasise its 
need for protection. Third, we use the security requirement proposed by the SRP to annotate the business 
process model. The annotation suggests the decision makers to meet the security requirement. Finally, we 
perform threat analysis with the help of potential threat analysis figure of SRP and inform the decision 
makers about possible security breach. This threat analysis stands as the rationale behind security 
requirement proposed by SRP. In the next chapter, we use this SRP application guideline to find SRP 
occurrences in two case studies and validate all SRPs. 
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Chapter 8 Validation 
 
In this chapter, we validate Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP) by conducting two case studies. The 
case studies involve two business processes collected from two business companies. These companies 
perform different types of functions and also they are not located at same location. We chose these 
different companies for the case study in order to examine the usability of SRPs in diverse business 
processes running in different contexts. 
 
8.1 Experiment Questions 
In each of the case studies, we answer the following three experiment questions on the basis of validation 
results. 
1. Are the security patterns usable? 
2. Do the patterns exist in real scenario? 
3. How many risks are found? 
 
8.2 Validation Methodology 
The validation methodology consists of five steps (figure 48). Step 1 – 4 are performed separately in each 
of the case studies. Step 5 (figure 48, grey coloured box) is performed jointly for both case studies. 
Case study introduction
Process quantification
SRP application
Answer to experiment questions 
(Result interpretation)
Result comparison
(Conclusion)
1
2
3
4
5
 
            Figure 48 Validation Methodology 
In the first step, we provide a short description of the company whose business process is used in case 
study. In second step, we count the number of processes, sub-processes, events, gateways, pool etc. and 
present the results in a table. This step helps to understand the extent and complexity of case study 
business process model. As third step, we apply SRPs using the pattern application guideline described in 
chapter 7. We also record their occurrences in a second separate table. The number of SRP occurrences is 
a good indicator of the presence of security risks in business process.  In step four, we answer the three 
predefined experiment questions on the basis of the data - which we get in first and second steps. Finally, 
in step five, we compare the results acquired from both case studies and present our conclusion. 
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8.3 Case Study I 
 
8.3.1 Case Study Introduction 
The company which is used in the first case study is a government statutory authority which acts as a 
source of land and property related information for individual, business and Government. This authority is 
in charge of maintaining land information of a part of Australia. This information includes land maps, 
satellite pictures, aerial photographs and various other spatial related data. This agency has been 
maintaining its website for many years. The information seekers can receive their desired information by 
using this website.  
8.3.2 Process Quantification 
We manually count the number of processes, sub-processes, events, gateways, pools, tasks, messages and 
sequence flows present in case study I business process model and present these in Table 3 by using 
separate columns. 
Table 3 Quantitative description of Case Study I business process model 
Processes Sub-
process 
Events Gateways Pools Tasks Message 
flows 
Sequence 
flows 
9 73 109 83 68 186 129 492 
 
8.3.3 SRP Application 
 
We apply ten SRPs in case study I business process using the four-step pattern application guideline 
presented in chapter 7. In table 4, 1st column lists the IDs of SRPs, 2nd column presents the numbers of 
SRP occurrences in case study I, and finally, 3rd column shows the percentages of the numbers of SRP 
occurrences in case study I. 
Table 4 SRP occurrences in business process of Case Study I 
SRP ID Number of SRP occurrences in 
case study I business process 
An extend, at which pattern 
influences the business process 
model 
SRP1 33 16.8% 
SRP2 33 16.8% 
SRP3 25 12.8% 
SRP4 35 17.9% 
SRP5 39 19.9% 
SRP6 6 3.1% 
SRP7 12 6.1% 
SRP8 1 0.5% 
SRP9 4 2.0% 
SRP10 8 4.1% 
Total 196 100% 
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8.3.4 Answers to Experiment Questions 
  
EQ1: It is hard to find 100% matches between SRP example business process diagrams and the parts of a 
case study business process diagram. Therefore, in addition to match the diagrams, we also consider 
finding the similarities in their contexts and scenarios. These similarities help to find SRP occurrences in 
case study I (see table 4, column 2) - which shows the usability of security risk-oriented patterns (SRP). 
EQ2: The business process which is used in case study I is taken from a statutory authority of Australian 
Government. This authority has been using this business process for several years to provide land and 
property related information to individual, business and Government. Table 4 Column 2 is displaying the 
occurrences of ten SRPs - which shows the existence of our security risk-oriented patterns in real scenario.  
EQ3: We find total 196 SRP occurrences in case study I (Table 4, bottom cell of column 2), and because 
each SRP addresses a security risk, so we are able to identify 196 security risks from case study I. 
 
8.4 Case Study II 
8.4.1 Case Study Introduction 
Case study II is based on an e-governance application processing system, which is currently being used in 
an administration bureau of a province in China. In this process, an apartment developer submits an 
application in order to get the approval for selling commercial apartments. The application proceeds 
through different checks conducted by different government agencies such as: Property management 
office, Demolition resettlement verification authority and many other public auxiliary offices. Finally, the 
process reaches to an end with three different possible decisions regarding developer’s application: 
Approved, Re-Apply, and Rejected. 
8.4.2 Process Quantification 
Similar to case study I, here we also manually count the number of processes, sub-processes, events, 
gateways, pools, tasks, message and sequence flows present in case study II business process and present 
these in Table 5 using separate columns. 
Table 5 Quantitative description of Case Study II business process model 
Processes Sub-
process 
Events Gateways Pools Tasks Message 
flows 
Sequence 
flows 
17 0 34 119 0 168 0 377 
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8.4.3 SRP Application 
 
We apply ten SRPs in case study II business process using the four-step pattern application guideline 
presented in chapter 7. In table 6, 1st column lists the IDs of SRPs, 2nd column presents the numbers of 
SRP occurrences in case study II, and finally, 3rd column shows the percentages of the numbers of SRP 
occurrences in case study II. 
Table 6 SRP occurrences in business process of Case Study II 
Pattern ID No# of pattern occurrence in 
business model 
An extend, at which pattern 
influences the business process 
model 
SRP1 6 20.6% 
SRP2 6 20.6% 
SRP3 8 27.5% 
SRP4 4 13.7% 
SRP5 2 6.8% 
SRP6 3 10.3% 
SRP7 0 0% 
SRP8 0 0% 
SRP9 0 0% 
SRP10 0 0% 
Total 29 100% 
 
8.4.4 Answers to Experiment Questions 
 
EQ1: In case study II, we consider finding matches in BPMN diagrams, contexts and scenarios between 
SRP example business processes and the parts of case study business process diagram. After completing 
analysis, we present the numbers of the SRP occurrences in table 6 column 2. These numbers act as an 
indicator of the usability of security risk-oriented patterns. 
EQ2: The case study II is based on a business process which is used by a provincial Government in China. 
From table 6 column 2, we see the numbers of SRP occurrences in case study II and, these numbers help 
to realise the SRPs existences in real scenario. 
EQ3: We find total 29 SRP occurrences in case study II (Table 6, bottom cell of column 2), and because 
each SRP addresses a security risk, so we are able to identify 29 security risks in case study II. 
 
8.5 Threats to Validity 
We follow some conventions while performing step 2 and 3 of validation methodology. They are listed 
below: 
 We do not consider any process model which is not prepared using English language. 
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 Some activity names in process models are unclear, i.e. they only convey proper meanings to the 
actual process owners or users, but not to us. Therefore, we keep such activities outside of validation 
scope. 
 We do not apply SRPs in the high level process models, because normally these high level process 
models are composed of sub-processes. Instead, we apply SRPs in their inside processes. 
If we do not follow these conventions or try to address the above mentioned factors in different ways, we 
might expect variations in the numbers of SRP occurrences. Above all, these occurrences are subjective, 
so it can vary from analysis to analysis. 
8.6 Result Comparison 
 From table 3 and table 5, we get clear idea about the size and complexity of these two case study 
business processes. Case study I has total 492 sequence flows, and on the other hand, case study II has 
total 377 sequence flows. Comparing the number of sequence flows, we can estimate that the case 
study I is broader than case study II. 
 Although larger in size, case study I seems less complicated than case study II. Case study I has less 
number of gateways than case study II, and these gateways are responsible for increasing the 
complexity of process model. From table 5, it is also evident that there is not a single sub-process and 
message flow present in case study II. 
 After applying developed security risk-oriented patterns (SRP), we identify 196 pattern occurrences in 
case study I and 29 patterns occurrences in case study II. While performing the analysis, we notice the 
process diagrams in case study II lacks details about the process, for instance, there are no separate 
pools, lanes, sub-processes, as well as no message flows. This could be the potential reason behind the 
identification of less number of security risks from it. 
 In case study I, we manage to find occurrences of all SRPs. In contrast, in case study II, occurrences 
of SRP7, SRP8, SRP9 and SRP10 are absent. 
 Each of the SRPs is developed for the purpose of mitigating single security risk. This notion helps to 
reach in conclusion that SRPs have detected total (196 + 29) or 225 security risks from both case 
study I and case study II. Furthermore, we can assume that Case study I is more vulnerable to security 
risks than case study II. 
 
8.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we use two case studies in order to validate security risk-oriented patterns (SRP). We 
specify three predefined experiment questions and later answer these on the basis of validation results of 
both case studies. The validation methodology consists of five steps. In each of case studies, we provide a 
short description of the company to familiarise the readers to the purpose and functions of business 
process. We use SRP application guideline - mentioned in chapter 7, to find the occurrences of SRPs. Ten 
of these occurrences (one for each SRP) are presented in the Appendix section of the report. The results of 
the analysis present quantitative descriptions of the business processes and show the number of 
occurrences of SRPs in those business processes. In addition, in table 4 and 6, we calculate the 
percentages of SRP occurrences with the purpose of getting clear idea regarding the extent of SRP 
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influences on each of the case studies. SRP occurrence identification task depends on security analyst’s 
wise judgement in application context and scenario. We mention a number of conventions - which we 
follow while performing validation steps. These conventions would help other validators to acquire 
validation result similar to ours. Finally, we analyse raw data from the tables and present comparative 
interpretations. Following chapter comes with our final opinions and conclusions regarding this research. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
 
At the beginning of the report, we present our motivation, scope, research questions and research 
methodology for developing business process in a secured way using pattern-based solution. We discuss 
about various security risk management frameworks such as: AURUM (Ekelhart, et al., 2009), CORAS 
(Lund, et al., 2011)  and ISSRM (Dubois, et al., 2010), and provide our arguments for choosing ISSRM as 
the framework of our research along with the detail description of it.  Superiority of BPMN (OMG, 2012) 
over other business process modelling languages is shown by presenting its fulfilment of modelling 
criteria, and ISSRM - BPMN alignment is established. We introduce the concept of patterns, the 
advantages of using these, different parts of patterns, and most importantly, present a template - which is 
aligned with ISSRM, for future SRP development. To determine the extent of SRP application area and to 
comprehend risk-vulnerability relationship, we scrutinise several vulnerability classifications and end up 
choosing the one presented in ‘Seven Pernicious Kingdoms’ as our vulnerability taxonomy paradigm. 
With our unified knowledge of ISSRM, BPMN, Security pattern and Vulnerability classification model, 
we develop ten Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP). In addition, four-step SRP application guideline is 
proposed in this report.  To demonstrate the effectiveness of SRPs in pattern-based development of secure 
business processes, we show their usability in two case studies.   
 
9.1 Answer to Research Questions 
The primary research question of this thesis was: 
RQ 1: How to make business process secure? 
Answer: In general, a business process analyst collaborates with a security analyst to search for security 
solutions for business process. At an early stage of process development, the business analyst shares the 
business process model with a security analyst. He helps the security analyst to identify and comprehend 
the value of business assets to the company. Both of them also help each other to define the security 
criterion for the identified business assets. Next, security analyst starts security risk analysis by finding out 
which IS assets are responsible for supporting the identified business assets. According to ISSRM domain 
model, vulnerabilities are the characteristics of IS assets, and these are also related to the security risks. 
Therefore, by identifying IS assets, security analyst is able to trace the origin of potential security risks 
present in business process model. Next, he follows the Security Risk-oriented Pattern application 
guideline in order to find the SRPs occurrences in the process model. If SRPs occurrences are detected, 
security analyst annotates the business process model with the security requirements proposed by the 
SRPs. Then, he hands over the annotated business process model to the business analyst. This model 
should provide the business analyst with the complete security needs for his company’s business process. 
He might ask for additional information (i.e. the controls specified by SRPs) from the security analyst 
regarding the technique of satisfying these proposed security requirements. However, before satisfying 
any security requirement, the business analyst needs to take into account the costs and time associated 
with it. So, the proposed security requirements need to be prioritised according to the severity of negative 
impacts of related risks on the business process.  More detail feedback such as: threat analysis diagrams 
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could facilitate this prioritising task. Finally, by satisfying the security requirements, business analyst 
develops pattern-based secure business process.  
RQ 2: What are the Security Risk-oriented Patterns to secure business processes? 
Answer: We developed ten Security Risk-oriented Patterns to secure business processes. They are briefly 
described below. 
SRP1 Pattern ensures the integrity and confidentiality of transmitted data between business entities. 
It addresses the security risk of unsecured data transmission when two or more business entities exchange 
data to carry on their business operations.  The threat scenario identifies that attacker can intercept the 
transmission medium which can result into the loss of data confidentiality and integrity. To minimise risk, 
pattern proposes two security requirements: make data unreadable before transmission, to keep it 
confidential, and calculate check-sum value, to ensure data integrity. To avoid risk, this pattern proposes 
to change the transmission medium which cannot be intercepted. 
SRP2 Pattern rejects malicious data and ensures the entrance of valid data into system. 
It analyses the danger of invalid data which originates from the business clients and enters into the IS of a 
company. The risk analysis identifies that it can cause the loss of business process integrity and attacker 
can make business entity unavailable to its clients. To avoid risk, this pattern proposes the requirement 
which defines a structured format for all incoming data, and restricts data which disregards any predefined 
format. 
SRP3 Pattern verifies the origin of received data and protects the integrity of business decision. 
It focuses two issues which can compromise the integrity of business process: the legitimacy and the non-
repudiation property of received data.  Pattern captures the risks of selecting wrong business strategies, 
and incorrect initiation of a business process (e.g. process invalid purchase order) - which can take place if 
a business does not verify sender’s verification. To reduce the risk, this pattern introduces the requirement 
of verifying sender’s digital signature. 
SRP4 Pattern protects the IS from Denial Of Service (DOS) attack. 
It discusses the problem of business service unavailability. An attacker can make a service inaccessible 
and prevent the legitimate users from using it – which affects a business. To avoid this situation, this 
pattern proposes the requirement to restrict internal and external packets for a specific time period by 
using proper router configuration.  
SRP5 Pattern implements Multi-Level Security (MLS) in data access and protects data from misuse by 
attackers. 
It addresses the issue of data retrieval interface where unauthorised individuals have access to confidential 
data. This raises the risk of leaking confidential data which can be misused in order to cause harm to 
business. To reduce the risk, this pattern proposes security requirement of using Multi-level Security 
(MLS), which means establishing levels of data access rights, restricting anonymous access at retrieval 
interface, and keeping track of data retrieval.   
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SRP6 Pattern saves data from attacker by encrypting it in data store. 
It catches the data store issues which stores data in plain format. If an attacker manages to establish access 
to this kind of data store, he can read confidential data. This compromises the confidentiality of data; and 
any misuse of secret information can have negative impacts on business. Pattern proposes two solutions to 
this problem: first, reducing risk by storing confidential data in invisible format (e.g. encrypted); second, 
avoiding risk by getting confidential data directly from client when it is needed, instead of storing it in 
data store.    
SRP7 Pattern ensures proper handling of parallel requests and protects the IS from deadlock condition. 
It describes a deadlock situation where a business activity or service holds a resource for infinite time and 
requests for the same resource again which creates a resource access lock. An attacker could deliberately 
create such scenario and make it unavailable to its users. To reduce the risk, this pattern proposes: the 
processes should request all needed resources in advance or release all of these before requesting any new 
resource. 
SRP8 Pattern maintains the integrity of business transaction by ensuring process atomicity. 
It solves data inconsistency problem in a business transaction. A transaction is complete after successful 
executions of several activities but, a single activity can cause the transaction to abort abnormally- which 
could result in writing conflicting data into system. This incident harms data integrity and causes business 
process to malfunction. Pattern proposes to implement external mechanism which tracks the transaction, 
and calls the compensation logic in case of activity failure to undo all changes which take place before the 
occurrence of failure. 
SRP9 Pattern secures shared data from corruption in TimeOfCheck / TimeOfUse (TOCTOU). 
It addresses the problem related to concurrent operations. When multiple activities from different locations 
access same data at the same time, this situation can cause the loss of data integrity which could lead to 
business process malfunction. To reduce the risk, the pattern proposes to implement locking protocol on 
data accessibility.  
SRP10 Pattern prevents internal system information from leakage during process exception. 
It focuses on the problem of information leakage which happens due to run-time exception. If exception is 
not properly handled, an attacker can intentionally raise the exception in order to get internal systems 
information for example, application configuration information - which he is able to mine and devise 
sophisticated attack to the system. To reduce the risk, this pattern proposes to handle system errors and 
exceptions wisely, so that the system does not expose internal information to unauthorised user. 
   
 RQ 3: How do the Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP) help to secure business processes? 
Answer: In this research, we presented ten Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP). We apply SRPs by 
performing four steps: Occurrence identification, Security criterion annotation, Security risk requirement 
annotation, and Security requirement rationalisation. In order to help security analysts to perform these 
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steps, the SRP application guideline is describe in detail in chapter 7. During validation, we discover total 
225 SRP occurrences in two industrial business process models. Each of these identified SRP occurrences 
corresponds to a single security risk. Furthermore, the SRPs consist of the description of security risks, 
vulnerabilities, security requirements and as well as solution controls – which both business and security 
analysts can use to address identified security risks. By this way, the Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP) 
help to develop secure business processes.  
 
9.2 Limitations 
The research contains several limitations: 
 Firstly, it is based on BPMN, which is relatively new concept in business process management. The 
current version BPMN 2.0 was released in January 2011.  Although, there are many graphical 
constructs available which could be used to represent business process, so far no construct can be 
found to express security risks. To facilitate our research work, we use ISSRM & BPMN alignment 
proposed by (Altuhhova, et al., 2012). 
 While conducting security risk analysis using BPMN, we accepted a certain level of subjectivity. 
Different security analysts may come up with different diagrams of the same scenario. This fact is also 
true in this report, but we tried to mitigate the subjectivity through our discussions with the thesis 
supervisors. 
 During validation, we only consider the business processes prepared in BPMN. Other business 
processes drawn in other modelling languages (e.g. EPC, UML) are not considered, thus limiting the 
scope of the thesis. 
 The validation process depends on the completeness of a given business process. The business process 
diagram which we have in case study I is more elaborately drawn than that of case study II, and we 
assume that due to this reason, we are able to find more security risks in the first case study than the 
second one.  
In the security risk-oriented patterns (SRP), we only propose the controls which can be implemented to 
prevent risk. We do not provide any detail description regarding control implementation, because we 
assume the IT engineers of a company possess sufficient knowledge and capability for completing this 
step. 
 
9.3 Future Work 
One of the promising future works related to this research could be the introduction of automation in 
security risk analysis. Software prototype tool could be developed. It would be able to take a business 
process model drawn in BPMN as input, and deliver result with annotated security requirements in the 
model. Developing and representing security risk patterns using other modelling languages can also 
become a new research direction. We could also calculate the complexity increase in business process 
after implementing the control. This could be a good decisive factor on whether a specific security 
requirement might be met. Measuring the performance of security analysts in risk mitigation using SRP is 
also an important future challenge.   
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Abstract eesti 
Turvaliste äriprotsesside mustritel põhinev arendamine 
Naiad Hossain Khan 
Magistritöö 
 
Iga andmeturbest huvitatud äriettevõte valib iseendale sobilikud turvameetmed, et vältida ootamatuid 
sündmusi ja õnnetusi. Nende turvameetmete esmane ülesanne on kaitsta selle äriettevõtte ressursse ja 
varasid. Äriettevõtetes aset leidvad õnnetused (vähemtähtsad või katastroofilised) on enamikel juhtudel 
oma olemuselt sarnased ning põhjustatud sarnaste turvariskide poolt. Paljudel andmeturbe spetsialistidel 
on raskusi leidmaks õiget lahendust konkreetsetele probleemidele, kuna eelmiste samalaadsete 
probleemide lahendused ei ole korrektselt dokumenteeritud. Selles kontekstis on turvalisuse mustrid 
(Security Patterns) kasulikud, kuna  nad esitavad tõestatud lahendusi spetsiifiliste probleemide jaoks. 
 
Käesolevas väitekirjas arendasime välja kümme turvariskidele suunatud mustrit (SRP ehk Security Risk-
oriented Patterns) ja defineerisime, kuidas kasutada neid mustreid vastumeetmetena turvariskidele 
äriprotsesside mudelite sees. Oma olemuselt on need mustrid sõltumatud modelleerimiskeelest. 
Lihtsustamaks nende rakendamist, on mudelid esitatud graafilises vormingus äriprotsesside 
modelleerimise keeles (BPMN).  
 
Me demonstreerime turvariskidele suunatud mustrite (SRP) kasutatavust kahe tööstusettevõtte ärimudeli 
näite põhjal. Esitame mustrite rakendamise kohta kvantitatiivsed analüüsid ja näitame, kuidas 
turvariskidele suunatud mustrid (SRP) aitavad demonstreerida andmeturbe nõrku kohti ärimudelites ning 
pakume välja lahendusi andmeturvalisusega seotud probleemidele. 
 
Selle uurimistöö tulemused võivad julgustada andmeturvalisusega tegelevaid analüütikuid jälgima 
mustritel-põhinevaid lähenemisi oma äriettevõtete kaitsmiseks, et aidata seeläbi kaasa ka infosüsteemide 
(Information Systems (IS)) kaitsmisele. 
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Appendix 
 
In this section, ten occurrences of Security Risk-oriented Patterns (SRP) in Case study I are presented 
(One occurrence per SRP). We provide short descriptions to demonstrate the matches between Example 
business process diagrams of each SRP and the parts of case study business process model.  
   
Occurrence of SRP1 
 
In 1.0 Prepare Plan (figure 49 (b)), the Lodging Party is sending User Log On Details to the Registry –
which validates the details and grants access to the system. However, when data travels through the 
transmission medium, it could be intercepted by an intruder or attacker. He can steal or manipulate the 
data and even more, he can retransmit the manipulated data back to the transmission medium. For latter 
case, the malicious data can cause harm to the Registry online system. 
SRP1 (figure 49 (a)) shows data is being submitted using the input interface and Business employs the 
data for later usage. The activity Submit data can be considered similar to T1 Log on to Portal activity, 
and the Employ data can be matched with T2 Validate User activity.  
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(a) Example business process of SRP1     (b) 1.0 Prepare Plan  
             Figure 49 Occurrence of SRP1 
Occurrence of SRP2 
 
In 7.0 Lodge Transaction business process (figure 50 (b)), The Lodging Party is sending Payment Details 
as an input to the Online Form or NECS. This is later being used by the Fee Payment Service sub-process 
activity. If some malicious input enters into the system instead of the Payment Details, the Fee Payment 
Service, this malicious input could raise error and cause the activity to crash. 
In SRP 2 (figure 50 (a)), the process also depends on the data obtained from outside of the system, and we 
can assume that the Business activity is similar to the Fee Payment Service.   
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(a) Example business process of SRP2    (b) 7.0 Lodge Transactions 
         Figure 50 Occurrence of SRP2  
Occurrence of SRP3 
 
In figure 4.0 Approve Plan business process diagram (figure 51 (b)), the Registry receives Plan 
Endorsement Report from the Planning Authority. The report is sent by using Planning Portal. On the 
basis of the report, the Registry changes the status - either it approves or disapproves. Because the sender 
of the Plan Endorsement Report is not verified upon the receipt, there could be a risk of taking wrong plan 
approval decision on the basis of unverified data.  
In SRP 3 (figure 51 (a)), we show the Transaction data is obtained by Business. After obtaining the data, 
the transaction is processed and at last business decision is taken - which can be aligned with changing the 
planning approval status in 4.0 Approve Plan business process diagram.  
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(a) Example business process of  SRP 3    (b) 4.0 Approve Plan 
              Figure 51 Occurrence of SRP3 
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Occurrence of SRP4 
 
In 1.0 Prepare Plan business process diagram (figure 52 (b)), the Registry is receiving User Log On 
Details from Lodging party and grant access to the system after validating the user details. The Registry 
provides online service, so there might be a limitation on the number of users who can receive the service 
at the same time. If an attacker intentionally creates too many half-open connections (Baccala, 1997), this 
might result into Denial of Service (DOS) (Loukas & Oke, 2009). 
In SRP4 (figure 52 (a)), the Business is receiving request and offering services to the user. The server  - 
which is receiving request, might also have a limitation on the number of users who can receive the 
service. This is a similar case to the Registry in 1.0 Prepare Plan (figure 52 (b)).  
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(a) Example business process of  SRP 4    (b) 1.0 Prepare Plan 
              Figure 52 Occurrence of SRP4 
 
Occurrence of SRP5 
 
In 10.4 Fee Statement Service business process diagram (figure 53 (b)), the company receives a request 
and then retrieves the data from the database. While accessing the data, the company’s employee might 
reveal confidential information - which he or she should not know.  
In SRP5 (figure 53 (a)), Employee retrieves the data and without any Multi Level Security (MLS) access 
protocol (Bell, 2005), the confidentiality of accessed data could be at risk. This scenario is similar to the 
process scenario presented in 10.4 Fee Statement Service (figure 53 (b)) 
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(a) Example business process of  SRP5       (b) 10.4 Fee Statement Service 
Figure 53 Occurrence of SRP5  
 
Occurrence of SRP6 
 
In 10.5 Refunds business process diagram (figure 54 (b)), Cashier receives a Refund request from 
customer, and he inserts the client’s details into the system. This details can be composed of both 
confidential (e.g. credit card number, social security number) and non-confidential information. If this 
confidential information is not encrypted before being saved into a database, it might be susceptible to 
future security breach. For instance, if an attacker becomes successful in establishing access to the 
database, he can retrieve all the unencrypted data and acquire the confidential information from it. 
In SRP6 (figure 54 (a)), the Business obtains data from outside and saves it to the data store. The Save 
data to data store activity is similar to the Insert Client Details activity present in the 10.5 Refunds (figure  
(b)) business process model. This could be a potential match to relate these two business processes. 
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(a) Example business process of SRP6    (b) 10.5 Refunds 
                     Figure 54 Occurrence of SRP6 
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Occurrence of SRP7 
 
In 6.4 Create NECS Transaction business process diagram (figure 55 (b)), the NECS receives request and 
Determine data required using business rules activity sends Data request- LIXI XML to Registry and waits 
for its fulfilment before proceeding to the next activity. In the meantime, if another request arrives at the 
system, then the second request is put on hold. If the reply of Data request- LIXI XML  requires long time, 
then this could create a deadlock condition in the system. 
The example business process diagram of SRP7 (figure 55 (a)) matches with 6.4 Create NECS 
Transaction (figure 55 (b)), where Perform business activity could be considered similar to Determine 
data required using business rules in figure 55 (b) . 
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(a) Example business process of SRP7    (b) 6.4 Create NECS Transaction 
               Figure 55 Occurrence of SRP7  
 
Occurrence of SRP8 
 
In 10.3.1 Process Payment business process diagram (figure 56 (b)), the Invoice/Fee Payment Service 
receives payment from Customer. The service checks whether the more payment is required or not. If 
more payment is required, then it automatically notifies the customer. Otherwise, it proceeds to the end. In 
former case, if the system crashes because of receiving malicious input or due to any other reason, then the 
automatic notification might not be sent to the customer. As a result that particular transaction will fail, 
because the customer will not send the remaining payment since he might not have received the 
notification from the system. A failed transaction could end up writing conflicting data into database.  
In SRP8 example business process diagram (figure 56 (a)), Process transaction activity correspondents to 
More fees required gateway and Notifying Customer activity present in figure 56 (b). This can be a 
rationale of considering figure 56 (b) as an occurrence of SRP8. 
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(a) Example business process of SRP8   (b) 10.3.1 Process Payment 
 Figure 56 Occurrence of SRP8  
 
Occurrence of  SRP9 
 
In figure 57 (b), the Invoice/Fee Payment Service receives outside client request. It checks the existence of 
customer’s account in the system (i.e. checks the balance of the customer account), then charge the debit 
from it. It could be possible that the system receives multiple outside requests from the users 
simultaneously and executes the same debit deduction operation. If there is no clear protocol on resource 
access mechanism, different amount of debits can be deducted from the same balance - which can result in 
miscalculation. 
The Retrieve data activity present in SRP9 example business process diagram (figure 57 (a)) corresponds 
to Confirm customer account exists activity and Update data could be thought similar to Charge to 
Account activity in the Process Payment business process model (figure 57 (b)).    
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(a) Example business process of  SRP9 
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(b) 10.3.1 Process Payment 
          Figure 57 Occurrence of SRP9 
 
 
Occurrence of SRP10 
 
In figure 58 (b), the New Payment System receives amount of payment from Cashier. It checks the amount 
with the original payment. If the entered amount is not greater than receipted amount, the new payment 
system executes in normal way and sends back the result to the user. On the other hand, if the entered 
amount is bigger than the receipted amount, the new payment systems displays error message. At this 
stage of execution, the system might leak information related to internal system to the user. The user can 
get detail knowledge about the system and devise more sophisticated attack techniques in order to cause 
harm to the system.   
In figure 58, we try to elicit the similarity between the example business process of SRP10 (figure 58 (a)) 
and the 10.5.2 Enter Refund Amount (figure 58 (b)) business process model. Both of these processes start 
on receipt of outside request, perform normal operations, and finally, send back the result to the system 
user. These two processes could be susceptible in leaking internal system information to an attacker. 
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(a) Example business process of SRP10 
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(b) 10.5.2 Enter Refund Amount 
Figure 58 Occurrence of SRP10 
 
  
